

**KANT'S DICHOTOMIC PHILOSOPHY
IN THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT**

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APRIL 2002

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

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This thesis concentrates mainly on Kant's aesthetic philosophy namely on the third *Critique*, *The Critique of Judgement*. Throughout his first two *Critiques* Kant focuses his attention on the most sublime end (eternal peace) and on the ideas of reason (freedom, God, soul). In the first and second *Critiques* ideas had not been proved to be used with legacy. Thus, this illegal attitude of reason became a wideknown 'gap' of Kant's philosophy.

In *The Critique of Practical Reason*, sensibility is still neglected so the ideas remain belong to a supersensible world. Thus, so far as ethics remains merely in the limits of reason it would be stillborn again. In this condition, aesthetics as the reflection on beautiful is nominated to help reason. For this the main subject of Kant

in *The Critique of Judgement* is the creation of the 'beautiful soul'. This is shown in the triangle of religion, ethics, and aesthetics.

In brief, Recognizing his failure in passing from the theoretical philosophy to the practical philosophy, Kant wants to find a legal passage between the two in *The Critique of Judgement*. This time Kant wishes the transition or leap be not too violent. But in the end the transition remains as a leap.

Key Words:

Kant, aesthetics, judgement, taste, imagination, sublime.

ÖZ

YARGI GÜCÜNÜN ELEŞTİRİSİ'NDE BULUNAN

KANT'IN İKİLİ FELSEFESİ

Bal, Metin

Yüksek Lisans, Felsefe Bölümü

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Bu tez ana konusu itibariyle Kant'ın estetik felsefesi, yani üçüncü *Eleştiri*, *Yargı Gücünün Eleştirisi* üzerine yoğunlaşmaktadır. Kant ilk iki *Eleştirisi* boyunca dikkatini en yüce erek (bengi barış) ve aklın ideleri (özgürlük, tanrı, ruh) üzerinde yoğunlaştırır. İdeler birinci ve ikinci *Eleştiri*'de yasal bir şekilde kullanılmak üzere kanıtlanamadıkları için aklın yasadışı bu tutumu Kant felsefesinin yaygın olarak bilinen bir 'uçurum'u haline geldi.

Kılgısal Aklın Eleştirisi'nde duyarlılık hâlâ ihmal edilmekte böylece idealar duyularüstü bir dünyaya ait olarak kalmaktadırlar. Böylece aklın sınırları içinde kaldığı sürece etik âtil kalacaktır. Bu durumda 'estetik' güzel üzerine bir düşünüm olarak akla yardım etmek için görevlendirilmektedir. Bu nedenle *Yargı Gücünün*

Eleştirisi'nde Kant'ın temel konusu 'güzel ruh'un yaratılmasıdır. Bu, din, etik ve estetik üçgeniyle gösterilmektedir.

Kısaca, kuramsal felsefeden, kılışsal felsefeye geçerken içine düştüğü yanlışın farkında olan Kant, *Yargı Gücünün Eleştirisi*'nde yasal bir geçit bulmayı arzular. Kant bu defa geçiş ya da sıçramanın çok şiddetli olmamasını dilemektedir. Fakat sonuçta bu geçiş bir sıçrayış olarak kalmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler:

Kant, estetik, yargı, beğeni, imgelem, yüce.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

C. J.	The Critique of Judgement
C. P. R.	The Critique of Pure Reason
C. Pr. R.	The Critique of Practical Reason

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This study argues that *The Critique of Judgement* is a synthesis of two neglected traditions in the theory of art prior to Kant: eighteenth-century British theory of taste and German theory of aesthetics. I further maintain that each theory of art was developed in the context of a specific theory of society: British theory of civil society and German theory of enlightened absolutism.

Kant's theory of aesthetics seeks a universality and necessity for taste which is neither a mere sensation (experimental), nor a concept (rational). If taste were merely experimental or merely rational then the idea of enlightened society and eternal freedom would be mere dream. Thus freedom would not be a project inscribed in the nature of man.

Kant seeks an intermediate subjective, universal and necessary validity, which emerges as a theory of society. The systematic study of art, of its nature, effects, and its function as an important value in human life was started by Baumgarten.¹ Baumgarten is the first man in the history of philosophy to think imagination as an independent faculty

¹ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*., p. 66.

of knowledge. He wanted to investigate neither mere taste nor mere sensations but a mode of knowledge.

Baumgarten's teachers Leibniz and Wolff had distinguished two kinds of knowledge: that which gives us 'clear ideas' of things that enables us to distinguish one thing from another and orients us in our perceptual environment; and that which gives us 'distinct ideas', distinct because, by breaking things down into their component parts, we understand their why and thus come nearer to the truth which lies behind appearances. Baumgarten accepts this division and turns his attention to a kind of knowledge which mediates between the two. Wolff's distinction reflects some of the problem involved in the attempt to apply a rational theory of law upon an 'irrational' semi-feudal social formation. Baumgarten attempts to reconcile truths of reason and truths of fact by aesthetics. For his search for a 'whole man' Baumgarten is named the true Aristotle of his age.² Only in art the object remains unanalysed. He asks whether there is a logic of imagination or not. He wants to legitimize inferior faculties of men: desire, imagination. For Baumgarten reason still remained the queen of the faculties.

Kant sought to awaken the dreamers with his *Critique* by bringing experience and reason together by introducing, after Baumgarten, the notion of 'aesthetics' as a theory of art. Kant sought to prove that a philosophy which did not relate reason and sense through 'aesthetics' was doomed to 'contradictory visions', or as they would later be called, 'antinomies.'

² Caygill, H; *Introduction, Aesthetics and Civil Society*, pp. 1-19.

Wolff was a dreamer. Kant rejected Wolff as a 'dreamer of metaphysics' in the bizarre *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* (1776) : "...The world of Wolff built out of pseudo-concepts hardly related to the world of experience."³ Wolff dreamt because he did not recognize the real limits to reason. Because of this Kant made use of Burke's psychological observations. But Burke was making empirical psychology not philosophy.

To make psychological observations, as Burke did in his treatise on the beautiful and the sublime, thus to assemble material for the systematic connection of empirical rules...is probably the sole true duty of empirical psychology which can hardly even aspire to rank as a philosophical science.⁴

Hobbes' *Elements of Law, Natural and Politic*, also closed an old and opened a new era, in political theory. *The Elements* is evidently a theory of society. It is also considered to be a critique against the theory of art. *The Elements* raised problems in the theory of society which Hobbes could only solve in *Leviathan* by recourse to a theory of art. The problems encountered by Kant by the theory of art in the third *Critique* were similar to those that Hobbes confronted in his philosophical development.

Hobbes' theory of society rejected natural law and faced, for the first time, the question: how is a society of asocial individuals possible ? He answered with a strong argument for the subsumption of all social relations under the legality instituted artificially by the state. The German response to Hobbes was to soften his conclusions with an appeal to natural law, while maintaining the dominance of the legality of the state over the morality of civil society. It is within this context of a theory of natural law

³ Kant, *Dreams of A Spirit Seer*, p. 59.

mixed with a justification of the absolute state that the Leibniz / Wolff philosophy appeared in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth-centuries.

It was in response to those problems that Baumgarten developed his theory of aesthetics in the middle of the century. The first use of the term 'aesthetics' in any connection with art is in Baumgarten's *Reflections on Poetry* (1735).

In accord with the general trend of the dominating form of pure reason, he attempted the experiment of submitting art to rational principles (and our relation to art, which, according to the prevailing interpretation, was taste). Taste and what is accessible in this capacity to judge (namely art) belong to the domain of the sensible, aisthesis. Just as thought is submitted to rational principles in logic, so also is there a need for a rational doctrine of sensibility, a logic of the sensible, aisthesis. Baumgarten therefore called this rational theory of aisthesis the logic of sensibility or 'aesthetics.' And despite Kant's opposition to the use of this title, the philosophical doctrine of art has been called aesthetics ever since.⁵

Kant is the second philosopher who deals with the concept of aesthetics in its relation to art. In the Transcendental Aesthetic of *The Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) aesthetics is exclusively a mode of knowledge⁶ : sensible intuition. In a footnote here Kant even rebukes Baumgarten for seeking to make aesthetics into a theory of art. Yet nine years later in *The Critique of Judgement*, Kant proposes a theory of art called aesthetics.

Holding this information in the mind as a background I developed my thesis according to certain related problems. Hence, in this thesis I have two main objectives. One is to fill the gap opened between reason and understanding by the third *Critique*. The other is to explain the dichotomic feature of Kant's aesthetics.

⁴ Kant, *First Introduction to C. J.*, tr. by James Haden, p. 42.

⁵ Heidegger, *What is A Thing ?*, p. 113.

⁶ In C. J. is not 'knowledge' but only a 'judgement'.

My first objective is to briefly summarize Kant's endeavor to fill the gap between the first and second *Critiques*. Accordingly, I show the source of the need for another kind of faculty, imagination. In this thesis the main problem is 'How does Kant reunite the faculties of the mind ? This work is done by following a dialectical method just as Kant followed through his critical works. This thesis is issued on an historical standpoint. This is because, to fill the gap that appeared as the scandal of philosophy on the way of being a science, Kant always opposes one faculty to another one. At the end Kant synthesizes them into a more comprehensive one.

If metaphysics⁷ was understood as the conception of the world as a whole, all Kant's effort, in each part of my thesis, can be regarded as a search for whether this unity is possible or not. "Reason intends to make all knowledge scientific in the rationalistic sense of the world, that is complete, systematic, a priori, apodictic, and dogmatic"⁸ This is a process in the sense of legislative trial for the right awareness of the facts (*Quid Facti*) and for the statement of the right judgement (*Quid Juris*).

At the very beginning of the thesis I focus on the general features of the age to provide an understanding of Kant's background. In the beginning section of the thesis the roots of aesthetic theories from where Kant's aesthetic theory develops are explained briefly. A brief notice is given on Kant's philosophical ancestors namely British empiricism and German rationalism. In this introduction to the subject I lay

⁷ "...the Queen of all the sciences" Kant, C.P.R. A viii, p.7.

⁸ Kant, C. P. R., p. 9

down the conditions out of which aesthetics is created at first as a science and secondly as the theory of art.

In the second and third chapters, I am concerned with Kant's conceptions of practical reason and aesthetics which conceived as to reach the lost unity of philosophy. However, as I suggested in the conclusion he never accomplishes this task.

At the beginning of Chapter 2, I express complaints of philosophers of the rotten situation of religion and show the harbinger of new morality. I mention Pietism, the best example as actor of secularization, to show source of the attempt to find a true morality. In the first section of Chapter 2, I claim that beauty is a link between ethics and theology. I developed the idea by showing the philosophical shift from realism of religion to symbolism of morality. In the end of the second chapter, I conclude that a need for the search of aesthetic judgement arises from the lack of sincere faith in those times and eventually showed the birth place of the conception of pure, universal morality.

In the first section of Chapter 3, I try to show the zenith of secular religion that is Kant's modern morality. In this section I explain that without the unity of theoretical and practical functions of reason freedom of men is not possible. At the end of the first section of Chapter 3, a door to the freedom is left ajar. I elucidate that Kant's conception of truthfulness of understanding, and goodness of practical reason are not enough for subject to be persuaded to substantiate the concepts of right and good in his / her action. For the persuasion of subject to apply an action in his/her behavior, the action must be regarded as beautiful according to a general measure.

In the second section of Chapter 3, I claim that practical use of reason is not enough for the freedom of society. I claim that empty principles of Kant's duty ethics have no power to persuade people towards an action. At the end of this section a passage to the aesthetics is seen explicitly.

In the end of the second section of Chapter 3, I explained that by producing the concept of the criticism of taste Kant destroys the dogmatic way of living and persuades subjects to choose a more beautiful life. This is reached not by constructive (reason) or regulative (understanding) thinking but by reflection (judgement). These conceptions of 'critique of taste' and 'reflection' are the two main character of a civic for the possibility of a civil society.

My second objective is to argue, in Chapter 4, that faculty of judgement, imagination, can supply a dynamic ground for the ideas. But in the end I claimed that Kant makes a fatal mistake by returning to the reason by the mediation of human ends to find universally valid principles for taste. In the end imagination is exposed to the violence of reason. While Kant insists on the opposite I developed the argument according to the idea that imagination is not autonomous. In the second section of Chapter 4, I show how Kant's aesthetic judgement remains deductive. In the third section of Chapter 4, I explained that Kant's aesthetics is rooted in anthropology. Likewise, I clarified that universal validity of aesthetic judgement is covered by the insurance of human nature.

For the possibility of the free person of enlightenment, Kant made classical metaphysics take an assent of ignorance or an inward limitation of thought. In order to

make room for faith he had to put knowledge aside. This attitude is surviving also throughout the third *Critique*. The work of art appears when the subject remains disinterested about it. In this process sensible desire (*Willkür*) is opposed to the desire of reason (*Will*). Accordingly, men by his / her nature prefers the beautiful one among the things he confronts. By this there would be no autocracy on knowledge; because, it is conditioned only anthropologically that is common to all.

Kant's culturalization policy forces violence upon men anthropologically. Education through art seemed to Kant the only way of closing the gap between concept (true insight) and idea (good action). The concept of education constitutes one of the key aspects of Kantian philosophy. The education is substantiated by the history that is indeed the revelation of nature.

In the fourth section of Chapter 4, I claim that Kant's aesthetic theory ends in morality. Since, if the nature of men is left to its reveal by education through art and culture then he / she would find eventually an end that is good for all. Kant's theory of aesthetics accompanies his social theory. The most beautiful art work is the society in which freedom of the subject is supplied. However, I focused on that his theory of society makes political freedom impossible. This is because Kant exhumes the dead body of intellectual intuition.

In the end Kant's conception of aesthetic judgement remains a semblance of an idea that is the thought of genius. There is no originality of work of art; because, it is at best a symbol of good, and it has no independent existence. It is not somewhere that is

conditioned by history and society. With these features *The Critique of Judgement* regards natural beauty as superior over the artistic beauty.

I conclude the thesis by making use of critiques made by several philosophers. Accordingly, so far as there is no harmonious balance between the faculties reason cannot take a single step forward. Kant does not destruct a faculty but forces reason's hegemony upon others. Kant's freedom of the spirit is to be achieved only through self-abnegation. Kant's aim in aesthetics is social, but he takes subject out of the aesthetic experience by suppressing the ideas of reason upon his judgement. Therefore aesthetic judgement loses its dynamic, and its living form. In addition, it becomes static, universal and valid for everyone.

CHAPTER 2

NEED FOR THE AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT

2. 1. Secularization of Morality: Pietism

Ethics was never very far from the mind of any Enlightenment thinker, and most felt that morality was, in the words of David Hume, "...a subject that interests us above all others."⁹ Also, if the 'beautiful soul', stood at the pinnacle of what Hume had confessed, was the predominant interest of his time, then the lacuna in our historical knowledge of the 'beautiful soul' serious indeed. For the distinct and sincere sense of morality at first the concepts of highest interest of humanity, which here seen as the ideas of reason by Kant namely soul, God and immortality, must be distilled.

Throughout the eighteenth century the Christian religious tradition, though constantly modified to meet changing expectations and needs, continued to exert a dominant influence on European society. Directing religion to its ultimate concern was possible first by creating a passage for it through which it could be felt in the vessels of an individual. This passage is ethics in its known history.

⁹ Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, p. 455.

The Christian religious tradition left no aspect of contemporary political, artistic, or intellectual life unaffected, and nowhere, perhaps, was its living presence more in evidence than in German-speaking lands. One of the most powerful forces shaping German culture in particular during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was the unconventional movement known as pietism. Pietism has been considered to be the best example of resurrection of sincerity in faith.

The Pietist tradition is principally indebted to medieval mysticism and is fundamentally at odds with Lutheran doctrine. Philip Jacob Spener who lived from 1635 to 1705, is generally considered to have been the founder of German Pietism¹⁰. Spener's book *Pia Desiderata* remained for a long time one of the most popular books of devotion in the history of Protestant church.

Kant attacks the dogmatic metaphysics of religious mystics as fanatical in *The Critique of Judgement*. He denies the moral value of fiction that relies on the aesthetic subject's surrender to the power of sympathy. He regards this sentimentality as an enfeebling substitute for principle. For example, Klopstock exaggerates the rhetoric of pietistic emotionality by the use of the concept 'disinterested truthfulness'. Similarly, Richardson's novels are debilitating because they enthrall, agitate, and impair the reader's senses with false and harmful concepts. Such reading corrupts character¹¹. For Kant a sentimental novel cannot be an object of aesthetic judgement. Therefore, Kant

¹⁰ Norton, R.E., *The Beautiful Soul*, p. 59.

¹¹ Hensley, *Emotionalism as Pietistic*, p. 125.

defines Richardson and Young as immoral mystics of taste and sentiment, and he imposes a moral framework upon the sincere spiritual life of Pietism.

All Pietists were deeply concerned about what they regarded as the degeneration of morality and religious faith in their fellow human beings. Christian duty toward the disadvantaged and weak always remained their ultimate goal. They felt that without reestablishing their own inner relationship to their God - without first 'reforming' themselves - they would be unable to aid those in greater need. Pietistic movement takes as a motto that *'theologia habitus practicus est'* (theology is a practical discipline). In Pietism, edificational self progress is the main object to be reached. The idea of perfection resides at the center of Pietist, indeed of Christian, ethics. Repentance occurs not only when one takes leave of coarse external sins and refrains from them; but when one goes into oneself and changes and betters the innermost bottom of one's heart.

Lutkemann, who lived from 1608 to 1655 was one of the most influential Lutheran theologian of his day, interested in 'the actual means' by which the soul experiences its union with Christ and in the inner manifestation of its successful completion. Following the tradition of exegesis St. Augustine had begun, Lutkemann thought that, although God had originally created us in his own image and given us 'beautiful soul' in his likeness, we no longer possessed that first form. By this, he introduced the theme of ugly to the debate. Therefore, the soul is brought to such beauty not only through cleansing and clothing it, but also through a new birth. For him, beauty of soul is nothing less than the last step toward personal divinity. Although this beautiful brilliance was based quite specifically on moral qualities, Lutkemann and the later

pietists did not speak, as the British philosophers would, of a specifically 'moral beauty', but rather always of a 'beauty of soul'.

This idea first reflected itself on the ideas of Leibniz. Leibniz' God is a civilized, rational deity who exerts indirect control through the positive example of his own benevolent perfection, representing the ideal to which everyone ought to aspire. Leibniz' ethical theory was grounded, not on hope or fear, but solely on the beauty and perfection of God. Kant is under the influence of Leibniz' sense of religion. Kant offered the following vivid description of the struggle for repentance:

According to Pietist hypothesis, the operation that separates good from evil (of which human nature is compounded) is a supernatural one- a rending and contrition of the heart in repentance, a grief bordering on despair that can, however, reach the necessary intensity only by the influence of a heavenly spirit. Man must himself beg for this grief, while grieving over the fact that his grief is not great enough (to drive the pain completely from his heart).¹²

Hence, Kant directs men into his inner side to explore naturally installed pure morally good principles of conduct. Now, this descent into the hell of self knowledge paves the way to deification. In other words:

When the fire of repentance has reached its height, the amalgam of good and evil breaks up and the purer metal of the reborn gleams through the dross, which surrounds but does not contaminate it, ready for service pleasing to God in good conduct. The radical change, therefore, begins with a miracle and ends with what we would ordinarily consider natural, since reason prescribes it; namely, morally good conduct¹³

Kant made explicit here that in practical terms the Pietistic conversion possessed an inherently ethical meaning, apart from any other personal rewards that might exist.

¹² Kant, *The conflict of The Faculties*, pp. 99-101

¹³ *Ibid*, p. 100.

While Kant looks for a unity between faculties, his touchstone is the border between knowledge and faith. We can easily say that all Kant's endeavor culminates in theology. Through a naturally installed good essence of human being, Kant coins the positive freedom of humanity against the negative freedom that reduces religion to a means of any authoritative structure.

2. 2. Moral Beauty

Kant is oscillating between an ethical and a religious worldview without arriving at any definitive and satisfying resolution of the conflict¹⁴. Kant's moral aim is always accompanied by his religious worldview. In Kant's aesthetics, that we ought to act as if God existed becomes a symbolic principle for reaching an ordered world*in which we feel at home. In the aesthetics, moral law replaces the world order. God becomes the *ordo ordinans*¹⁵.

"According to Kant, ethics replaces metaphysics."¹⁶ By this way soul, God, and freedom become possible. Reconciliation with God for hope that divine grace will bring the artwork to its consummation is the final level of moral perfection. The analogy makes possible to see men as a God. This anthropomorphism shows symbolically that we are not God, but we have a feeling arising from being like a God¹⁷

Rather than continuing the tradition that had posited 'reason' and 'sentiment' as opposites, and mutually exclusive grounds for moral knowledge, Hume suggested that we see them as necessary and complementary correlates. Like the Stoics and

¹⁴ The point can be observed in Kant's *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*.

¹⁵ The ordering order which is actualized in our moral action.

¹⁶ Kroner., *Kant's Weltanschauung*, p. 26.

¹⁷ In the realm of feelings there is no imitation. Every feeling is original. For this we can produce feelings from the fact that is not real. The educational feature of the arts rests here. His feelings take man on a vantage point. From this original power does the risk of artwork arise because it stands on the imperfect human nature.

Shaftesbury before him, Hume felt that rational calculations alone are incapable of providing the necessary motivation for virtuous actions. He, therefore, agreed that the final guide in pronouncing an action good or evil “depends on some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species”¹⁸ Accordingly, the final product of human sentiment that has been cultivated by an active, reasoning mind is nothing other than ‘moral beauty’.

Although Deism already lost much of its momentum in England, many French thinkers still eagerly appropriated this British brand of a rationalized natural theology in the hope that it would provide potent new weapons to combat a well fortified state religion. Although part of the original purpose of moral beauty was to help disentangle ethics from theology, the continued connection between religion and morals, especially for German speaking thinkers is explicit. The Hellenic ideal of ‘kalakagothia’ and its latter-day German appropriation is important. The traces of religion in the early eighteenth century were pervasive and profound: the music of Bach, the novels of Richardson, even the scientific researches of both Leibniz and Newton are unthinkable outside the context of Christian belief.

Most often, in fact, philosophers of the eighteenth century deemed the Church to be an increasingly intrusive impediment to an individual, and individually acquired relation to God. For example, David Hume with a liberal dose of self-conscious irony expressed the predicament this way: “To be a philosophical skeptic is, in a man of

¹⁸ Hume, *Inquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning in The Principles of Morals*, p. 171.

letters, the first and most essential step towards being a sound, believing Christian."¹⁹

The attempts by some British philosophers to disengage morality from religion and to offer a justification of ethical action based on an understanding of human nature alone did not mean that they denied the reality of the Christian God, or even less that they rejected the general validity of religious thought.

True virtue can be grafted only upon principles such that the more general they are, the more sublime and noble it becomes. These principles are not speculative rules, but states of the consciousness of feelings that live in every human breast and extend themselves much further than over the particular grounds of compassion and complaisance. I believe that I sum it all up when I say that it is the feeling of beauty and the dignity of human nature. The first is a ground of universal affection, the second is of universal esteem.²⁰

As we have seen, the treatment of the soul within the boundaries of Church is determined very strictly, allowing it no freedom. Contrary to this Hume attempts to find an outlet for the freedom of the soul by the concept of 'moral beauty'. Finally, Kant introduces the notions of feeling of beauty and the dignity of human nature in order to create an autonomous soul.

¹⁹ Hume, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, in *Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects*, p. 575.

²⁰ Kant, *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime*, p. 60

CHAPTER 3

PRACTICAL USE OF REASON

3. 1. Impossible Freedom

Practical use of reason is necessary for a universal morality, yet not satisfactory.

The deficiency of practical philosophy is even greater than that of speculative philosophy; for it has still to be discovered in the first place whether the faculty of knowledge or feeling....exclusively decides the primary principles of practical philosophy.²¹

In Kant's time there was a strict clash for the possibility of the unity of life that is metaphysics. Kant, seeing that the freedom of the human is ignored, looked for a way to solve the problem of reconciliation from the respect of the employment of reason by unfolding it in twofold employment of reason. One is theoretical the other is practical. As a consequence there emerges a 'great gulf' between the two domains. Kant assumes that if we separate entirely the two dimensions of 'ourselves' from each other, then we can reconcile necessity and freedom. (C.P.R.; A552: B580)

In the final reflection on moral philosophy an attempt is made to supplement a Wolffian formal principle of perfection with the material principle of moral feeling.

²¹ Kant, *Selected Pre-Critical Writings*, p. 34

Kant begins this reflection on 'divinity and ethics' by defining obligation as absolute necessity. The formal principle of perfection is the obligation to maximize perfection; Kant believes this formal rational principle to be insufficient as a source of real obligation. Kant argues that there is no immediate leap²² from rational perfection to real social obligation, a strong criticism of Wolff's perfectionist theory of society.

Kant seeks the ground for the necessity of these material principles of obligation in real existence rather than in the abstract formal principle of perfection, in moral feeling rather than the law of perfection.

In the domain of freedom ratio waits to be rewarded or valued by another critic. This time factum makes a person free to the creation of his own world. This subject has the regulation of pure reason in its universal and necessary function. It applies this regulation for the certainty and validity of the principles of pure reason in the phenomenal world; In my opinion this application is questionable. 'Supersensible one' aims to influence the 'sensible one'- namely, the concept of freedom aims to actualize the purpose which is put forward by its own laws in the sensible world²³. This is the reason why the supersensible world is the copy world (*natura ectypa*) for it is containing the possible effect of the idea of the real world (*natura archetypa*) and the sensible world²⁴.

²² Ibid., pp. 32, 33.

²³ C. J., prg. 2, 176 / 14.

²⁴ C. Pr. R. *Analytic of the Deduction of the Principles of Pure Practical Reason*; A 43 / 44.

For Kant the possibility of metaphysics is only immanent (C.P.R.; B223). This possibility is limited in the practical use of reason after the limitation of the theoretical use of it. Thus we can know theoretically only what has been, what is, and what will be in nature (C.P.R.; A 547 : B575). A 'holy' freedom which can be 'actual' beyond phenomena can be possible in the practical employment of reason.

Reason can produce some 'pure concepts' (ideas) without any sensible intuition. Knowledge cannot be possible without it. (C.P.R.; B 166) There are some concepts which we cannot know but can think (C.P.R.; BXXV). Classical metaphysics is insufficient to determine the objective validity of these ideas; for human reason, in its 'pure formal' and conceptual activity, cannot extend our knowledge of actuality beyond sensibility. There ought to be freedom, otherwise pure rational and 'universal' morality would be impossible. We have to postulate it as the condition of moral law. For the legitimate use of the concept of the unconditional, reason has to complete all the series of conditionals. Here leap is owned by the independent existence of the ideas of pure reason, not by any psychological element as material cause and subjective feelings which European metaphysics before Kant had based the ideas on.

If we prove that neither body nor soul are substance in respect to sensibility and theoretical reason (understanding) we can explore the practical function of reason, independent of causality, by which our freedom is possible. Search for the unconditioned without the unity of theoretical and practical function of reason leads to the syllogisms :

1: Search for an ultimate subject which produces the paralogism as a kind of transcendental illusions-categorical syllogism-because all categorical propositions are reducible to subject-predicate form (C.P.R., A 344; B 406). Here the aim is to determine a subject as a substance to give rise to the idea of immortality of the soul ('cogito') (body-mind problem)

2: A search of reason for the series of conditions which produces antinomies - hypothetical syllogism - it is a search for ground and all hypothetical propositions express a relation between 'ground' (condition) and consequent (conditioned).

3: A search for the idea of unconditional or complete being (i.e. God)
Disjunctive syllogism (C.P.R. B 447)

For Kant the antinomies arise inevitably from the nature of human reason.

The thesis of the third antinomy is on the possibility of the freedom of human beings;

Thesis; Causality in accordance with the laws of nature is not the only way from which the appearances of the world can be derived and unified. To explain these appearances it is necessary to assume that there is also another causality, which is that of freedom (Dogmatic rationalists).

Antithesis; "There is no freedom; everything in the world takes place solely in accordance with the laws of nature." (Dogmatic empiricists) (C.P.R.. P. 409 A., 444 – B 472)

For the proof of the thesis Kant assumes that if everything in the natural world takes place solely in accordance with the laws of natural causation, there would be

always 'relative' and 'conditional' causes and never a first beginning. Thus it must be assumed that there is an absolute spontaneity of the cause whereby a series of phenomena begins of itself. A causal thing cannot be taken out of its place in causal series. For example freedom, immortality, God; these are not derived from experience but are confirmed by experience. Other philosophers before Kant tried to solve this problem through the use of intellectual intuition.

...If we understand by 'noumenon' an object of a 'non-sensible intuition', we thereby presuppose a special mode of intuition, namely, intellectual, which is not that which we possess, and of which we cannot comprehend even the possibility. This would be 'noumenon' in 'the positive sense' of the term (C.P.R.; B 307).

The residuum of intellectual intuition now stands here as empty concepts because they are not known by the mediation of intuition but an action. Freedom, immortality and God are the 'pure concepts', ideas, and can be called as noumenon. This is because they cannot be known by the work²⁵ of understanding that is imposed upon it by reason. The concept of 'thing in itself' is that which has no content, it is an empty form of being. It is an X which the faculty of understanding puts as a transcendental object against the empirical object. A 'thing in itself', a noumenon, exists in a positive sense for an intelligence (C.P.R.; A 252 : B 309). In morality we do not strive to know because here the subject is noumenon. For this ignorance is unavoidable (B XXIX).

The independent existence of a person is not possible in the limits of theoretical reason. Theoretical reason in its empirical (immanent) application can never be conscious of an object as merely 'thinking being' (*cogito*) but only of a concrete

(individual) being who successively (in time) thinks, feels, or perceives this or that appearance (in space). Theoretical reason because of his ignorance of an object does not supply an independent existence to a person.

We do not know about our freedom through intuition. Freedom is only thought and not intuited. “ In the synthetic original unity of apperception, I am conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, but only as I am. This representation is a thought, but not an intuition.” (C.P.R., p.168; B 157) In theoretical reason we cannot represent ourselves as a whole because the unity remains unreached as the unsuccessful result of the task of understanding. Now we can not intuit our independent existence but think ourselves free.

A human being, as a thinking being, by means of and because of his ‘spontaneous activity’ of pure reason, recognizes himself also as a ‘pure rational self’. A thinking being recognizes that he has a spontaneity of his pure rational activity from phenomena. In its practical sense, transcendental freedom is no longer an allusion of *Transcendental Dialectics* (C.P.R. p.632; A.800 - B 828). Freedom as unconditional ‘self-determination’ is not in contradiction with ‘causal-determination’, but with ‘predetermination’ of the self in time²⁶ Although pure rational ‘knowledge’ has only a negative sense, a pure rational will and action can have a positive sense. Subjective principles are material principles, because every feeling or desire is an inclination to an object, and we cannot know, in a priori , pure formal, universal and necessary manner,

²⁵ To reach pure concepts of reason and use them legally the absolute unity of the series of the conditions of phenomenon has to be completed.

whether an object of desire is associated with the taste of pleasure or displeasure of each person²⁷:

Everything in nature works according to law. Only a being who reasons can act from the idea of law, that is act on principles. We can call this ability the will. And since the ability to determine one's actions on principle requires reason, we can see the will and practical reason as one and the same ability²⁸

Any practical principle which takes its origin from reason alone, but also from feelings, inclinations and desires (from phenomenal objects) is subjective. "Every feeling has only a private validity, and no man's feelings can be apprehended by another"²⁹

The abstraction of all sensible and heterogeneous objects of desire from the faculty of will is necessary for an autonomy of free will. For example a lie or a crime are sensible effects, but they also have an intelligible cause outside time. It is for this reason that we ought not to identify practical reason and freedom: in freedom there is always a zone of the good will by means of which we can always choose against the moral law. We may also describe it as the only thing that is good in itself, good independently of its relation to other things.

By the faculty of will we can reach universal principles that is good for every person. These are pure rational form of a practical principle. Kant calls this pure rational form of a practical principle (i.e. moral law) as 'categorical imperative'³⁰ Here

²⁶ Kant., *Religion Within The Bounds of Reason Alone* p. 45

²⁷ Kant., *Grounding For The Metaphysics of Moral*, p. 14

²⁸ Kant., *On the Foundation of Morality*, p. 105

²⁹ Kant, *Lectures on Ethics*, p. 38.

³⁰ - Always act on a maxim which you can will to become a universal law of nature, p. 140

- Always act on a maxim so that you treat humanity whether in your own person or in another as an end and never merely as a means. p. 157

- Always act on a maxim by which the will consider itself as making universal law, *ibid.* p. 165.

'categorical' means (opposite of hypothetical) the principle which comes from reason alone and thus unconditional, universal, and necessary. Human beings as moral beings contain in themselves the supreme end for their existence.

In *The Critique of Practical Reason* freedom falls again here by the given categorical imperatives. Throughout the categorical judgement the subject does not feel responsibility for the results of his action. This is because the concordant principles of practical reason inadequate, and there is no need for the substantiated proof in the realm of action. As long as Kant wants to form a morality that is logically valid for everyone he reaches inadequate practical judgements that have no power over our action. Kant's practical theory needs another feature to be active in our behaviors.

Thus, Kant has not yet a moment that forces the subject spontaneously to the preference of doing a good thing. Now there appears a gap between true and good. A third concept is needed to fill the gap between true of understanding and good of reason. "I understand by Idea a necessary concept of Reason to which no congruent object can be given in experience."³¹ Now this relationship is to be constructed for the actuality of morality in our life.

Moral philosophy appealed to natural law as the source of moral and legal obligation, and conceived of natural law as that which would providentially establish the common good through an irrational feeling of obligation; the celebrated moral sense, running alongside this argument, and exemplifying it, was developed the theory of a feeling of beauty, transmitted through the sense of beauty or taste.

Accordingly, we can define the enlightened man of Kant as actual man, formed by the reconciliation of rational and sensible beings, having the faculties of *Will* (the ability to choose) in respect to their rational (autonomous) and *Wilkür* (heterogeneous and unfree) in respect to sensible characters.³² Yet, in this theory Kant does not give a rational answer to the question: Why is good must be preferable for human beings ? This remains to be answered in *The Critique of Judgement*.

³¹ C. P. R., A 327- B 383

3. 2. Freedom Realized by Aesthetics

For Kant a free person is created only in a civil society. Civil society is possible only by the development of the character. For this the key concept is the critique of taste.

Practical use of reason is not enough for the freedom of society. It is an individual salvation and not the salvation of society. In relation to ethics and politics the critical function of art is 'reflective and analogical' rather than 'transitive and ideological'. This is because it concerns the basis for the political ideal, in which human is free, rather than the ideal itself³². To make a bridge between theoretical and practical use of reason Kant creates pure aesthetic judgement. Taste, like a moral sense, is a feeling ; but how may a feeling be granted universality ? This theory is deeply grounded on a view of society. Thus, Kant's theory of aesthetics is interwoven with a social theory. The most striking example of this mental shift from theoretical possibility to putative certainty was the eighteenth-century revival of physiognomy³⁴, the ancient practice of reading external traits as legible signs of inner character. For in its equation between physical beauty and moral goodness, physiognomy assumed the reality of

³² The ability to choose is the faculty of desire (*Willkür*), the will is the faculty of practical reason which implies to a 'pure rational will'. *Religion Within The Bounds of Reason Alone.*, XCV-CIII.

³³ Thierry de Duve, *Kant After Duchamp*, p. 441.

³⁴ The appearance which reflects one's personality and character.

beautiful souls. Accordingly, aesthetic judgement is again related to the individualistic feature of the soul³⁵ substantiated in the character.

European philosophy was reductionist³⁶ on the human feelings about the time of Kant. Here Kant's aesthetics fills the empty principles of the duty ethics. This is because aesthetic judgement has always power that shows human beings the way to the civilization. Aesthetic judgement is like a drama brought to be written by its agent that upholds the person on the Archimedean point of his world.

For Kant history and state are means to reveal the human ends in nature. History³⁷ is the process of the accomplishment of freedom and the good sovereign in the sensible world. Thus it implies an original synthetic activity of man. And the state must be responsible for the freedom of its citizens. The state, finally, exists primarily to make claims to property rights both determinate and secure, and anyone claiming property rights thus has both the right and the obligation to join in a state with others. Both claims to property and expressions of philosophical and religious opinions, for example, are expressions of human autonomy. But while one person's property claims may directly limit the freedom of others, and thus his beliefs do not require the consent of any other. The state, therefore, has no right to intervene in these matters. This fundamental

³⁵ Aristotle, *Poetics*, Chapter VI. p. 49.

³⁶ For example Hobbes and Spinoza reduce Christianity to the level of 'religion', then reduce religion to a form of 'behavior', and further reduce all behavior to the dynamic relations among 'passions' or 'affects'.

³⁷ C. J. prg. 83.

difference between the state's proper concern with property and its improper concern with personal belief defines Kant's liberalism.³⁸

The possibility of the critique of taste presents the man in his judgement on his world autonomous and the civilization as an artwork of society. So the society becomes a public-legislative authority, that is, a civil society. This is a necessary transformation for the animation of the main capacities of men that features them as what they are. The main figures in the theory of taste: Shaftesbury (1671-1713), Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746), Kames (1696-1782), David Hume (1711-1776), and Edmund Burke (1729-1797) were also the main figures in the theory of civil society. Civil society is a work of art, a harmony of diverse individuals, each of which forms an essential part of the general symphony and design. Their participation is unreflective, they act according to immediate impulse.

The chasm between individual feeling of morality and the general interest is bridged by a reified providence. In Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Kames, and Burke, the individual feeling and the general interest are united by a 'natural law', providentially established and operating through the moral sense. Hume differs from the rest of the theorists of taste and civil society in abandoning the notion of providence, and seeking to specify the relation between the particular and the general through a secular theory of society.

³⁸ It is only implicit in Kant's *Metaphysics of Morals*, but becomes explicit in his political writings.

Individual moral and artistic response are united with the general interest or standard through a reflected sympathy. Hume eventually abandons this position in favour of a skepticism which sees the relation between individual response and the general interest as dark and obscure. Adam Smith comes at the end of this tradition of moral philosophy, marking its transformation into political economy. His theory of the 'invisible hand' of the market is the end point of the search for a means of uniting individual and the general. It takes over the role played previously by natural law and providence. Kant turns to the natural law and supplies a providence through the ideas of reason justified by morality. In *The Spirit Seer*, he establishes a fixed point or source of universal and necessary obligation in the 'general will'.

Kant could subscribe to neither an unreflective faith in the providence of the market, as did the British theorists, nor to a legislation of perfection demanded by German theorists preeminently Wolff. He sought an intermediate theory which would attribute to moral feeling the properties of law, a theory which would avoid the extremes of blind feeling and an empty law. This problem also informs the later *Critique of Judgement* where Kant works to ground the judgements of the beautiful without, as in *The Observations*, making them a matter of blind solipsistic feeling, nor binding them to the law of perfection.

The Spirit Seer follows the *Observations* in offering a theory of adoptive virtue and relative reflection³⁹ but differs in substituting for the principle of general virtue, in the *Observations* the vague totality of feeling for the whole of humanity a principle of the general will.

The attempt to reconcile perfection and the moral sense in abstract signifies an attempt at a theoretical reconciliation of British theory of civil society and German theory of legal absolutism. The result of this attempt to reconcile a liberal theory of the market with legalistic theory of the state was the mysterious general will, adopted from Rousseau to serve as the supersensible basis of individual feeling and the general good. It is through these ideals that we can tie together the realms of nature and freedom, because aesthetic experience offers us a palpable image of our moral freedom, and a scientific conception of the world as a system of interrelated beings makes sense only as an image of the world as the sphere of our own moral efforts. Transition is needed for the possibility of freedom.

Pleasure from the moral law seems to be absurd but if it springs from the faculty of taste it becomes understandable. With Kant the age of education⁴⁰ through aesthetics begins. In his aesthetics we witness this by the "propaedeutic for establishing (good) taste consists in the development of moral (*Sittlicher*) ideas and the cultivation of moral

³⁹ "I shall not dwell at length upon those drives whereby, generally speaking, we attach as much importance to other peoples' opinions, and seek applause and respect from others." Kant, *Dreams of A Spirit Seer*, p. 30.

⁴⁰ This theme is not new for example "the two main components of the early education of the guardians in the Republic, gymnastic and music, are focussed primarily on the child's feelings and emotions; the aim is to inculcate the right tastes and attitudes, and to form good habits of

feeling.”(C.J. 356) The process of civilization is resembled to the artwork because in art “we make real a preconceived concept of an object which is a purpose for us” (C. J. 192).

Kant makes an analogy between pure aesthetic judgement and pure moral act. A pure aesthetic judgement is one that is as free of interest as the pure moral act is free of motive. A pure aesthetic judgement is characterized by disinterested pleasure like the pure moral act is characterized by disinterested duty. Because of our ignorance of the thing-in-itself this kind of judgement is the negative touchstone of truth. But reason inevitably ventures⁴¹ to supply a legitimate ground for the usage of the ideas like God, world, and soul. For Kant ~~this~~ ideas cannot remain ineffable. The possibility of a civilization depends on this condition.

To eliminate any subjective fancy of the conception of the world Kant tried to explore an objective ground that preserves equanimity of fancy. For Kant what is ugly is the Willkür or the animal side of will. The beautiful is concordant with the ideas of reason that supplies a unity of the life free from any redolence of subjectivity.

In Kant’s day aesthetics had not the logical certainty of the natural sciences. It was accompanying to the fate of metaphysics⁴². So far as aesthetics remains out of the domain of critique we cannot be sure whether our life is produced according to the

behavior.” Devereux “Socrates’ Kantian Conception of Virtue”; *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, vol. 17, 1979.

⁴¹ Reason’ satisfaction is a referee in the free play between understanding and imagination.

⁴² “Now, however, the changed fashion of the time brings her only scorn; a matron outcast and forsaken, she mourns like Hecuba: But late on the pinnacle of fame, strong in my many sons. now exiled, penniless.” (Ovid, *Metamorphoses*. xiii) Kant, *Preface* to First Edition of the C.P.R.

benefit of society or not. There is a difference between sophists and the genius. Measure for the judgement is created by the free will of the genius. Categorical imperatives are for dilettantes and the creation of the common soul is the work of the genius because only he is aware of the sublime. In its limited and categorized transcendental unity the whole world is hold in the mind of the genius. Here it is not reason, imagination, and understanding but the realm of the mind. Here is the ideology, or the objected form of the world posed upon the taste of a world-view. By demanding the universality of the judgement of taste Kant does not mention sophists in this realm. For the elimination of the sophists in the realm of the aesthetic judgment Kant follows welfare of society and ends this judgment in the substantiation of *sensus communis*. And for this Kant forces the critical philosophy in the realm of aesthetics⁴³.

⁴³ "Criticism alone can sever the root of materialism, fatalism, atheism, free-thinking, fanaticism, and superstition, which can be injurious universally; as well as of idealism and skepticism, which are dangerous chiefly to the Schools, and hardly allow of being handed on to the public." Kant, B. xxxv. p. 32. *Preface* to the second edition. C. P. R.

CHAPTER 4

MEDIATING POWER OF THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT

4. 1. Transition to the Aesthetics

“It is only production through freedom, i.e, through an act of will that places reason at the basis of its action, that should be termed art.” (C. J. 303) Art as the scheduled programme of human labor in history is formed by rational deliberation. Kant finds his consolation (the union of the faculties) in the artwork because it is the effect of a causality according to ideas⁴⁴. Here ideas gain a dynamic power and become active. By defining beauty in terms of the kind of judgement Kant provides a subjective criterion for art. By widening the field of aesthetics to embrace not only the beauties of nature but such phenomena as human conduct he opens up a new age for philosophy. Kant does not take aesthetics as a science.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, vol XXIII. 1995, Munzel., *Kant's Philosophical Basis of Proof For The Idea of the Morally-Good*.

⁴⁵ Inspiring from Kant, Wittgenstein does not speak on aesthetics because for him other philosophers speaks on it as it were a kind of science. Wittgenstein, “*Lessons on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*”

In *The Critique of Judgement* Kant's heuristic⁴⁶ method appears more clearly than of the first two critiques since the process of discovery solves its problem, the possibility of freedom, by the mediating power of the imagination.⁴⁷ Kant rejects aesthetics as a theory of art in *The Critique of Pure Reason*. The Transcendental Aesthetic forms the first part of the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements. Here Kant introduces 'aesthetics' as the name for the science of sensibility initially set forth in *The Inaugural Dissertation* eleven years previously, "The science of all principles of a priori sensibility I will call transcendental aesthetic" and he distinguishes it from the principles of pure thought which is called transcendental logic.⁴⁸ It is the empirical 'universality of the laws of aesthetics' that led Kant to reject aesthetic as a theory of art in *The Critique of Pure Reason*.

Kant discovers empirical validity of aesthetic rules as a theory of society in *The Critique of Judgement*. Kant cannot take the leap of faith in the market which underlies the British theory of taste and moral sense, and which guarantees their universality and necessity. Delight in the good presupposes an ideal of perfection. To think something good the subject has to know what the object is intended to be, i.e., the subject has to have concept of the object. The attribution of a feeling of pleasure to a particular perception must be valid both necessarily and universally. The beautiful is what pleases universally.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Gr. heurisko, find out

⁴⁷ The concept of theos is a mediatory concept between the necessity and freedom

⁴⁸ C.P.R., A 21, B 35.

⁴⁹ Kant, C. J., p. 60.

There are two kinds of beauty: free beauty or beauty which is merely dependent. The first presupposes no concept of what the object should be (For example; flowers, music that is not set to words); the second does presuppose such a concept and, with it, an answering perfection of the object. (for example; beauty of man or of a building)⁵⁰

Kant ranks the free beauty woodland circles and wallpaper above the dependent beauty of fine art and architecture. This is because to prove the universality of the feeling of beauty it must be free from any interest, and must be generated by purposefulness without purpose (*Zweckmässigkeit ohne Zweck*).

The agreeable (*Angenehm*) is defined as that which the senses find pleasing in sensation. Concept of beauty appears as a measure to differentiate the human from the animal:

The agreeable is what gratifies a man; the beautiful what simply pleases him; the good what is esteemed, i.e. that on which he sets an objective worth. Agreeableness is a significant factor even with irrational animals; beauty has purport and significance only for human beings.⁵¹

Taste, like moral principles, claims to be autonomous. To make the judgements of others the determining ground of one's own would be heteronomy. "The judgement of taste determines its object in respect of delight with a claim to the agreement of every one, just as if it were objective."⁵² The 'collective reason' or 'possible judgements' are united with the individual judgement through reflection. Kant's mediation, or search for a subjective principle, becomes the social justification of the universality and necessity of the individual judgement of taste.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 72.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 49.

⁵² Ibid., p. 136.

The Critique of Judgement is based on the division of the aesthetic and the teleological judgement. "By the first is meant the faculty of estimating formal finality (otherwise called subjective) by the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, by the second the faculty of estimating the real finality (objective) of nature by understanding and reason."⁵³ Like a pure theoretical reason and categorical imperatives Kant presupposes a pure judgement of taste which is uninfluenced by charm or emotion, and whose determining ground, therefore, is simply finality of form.

What ties these subjects together is again the idea of autonomy⁵⁴. Judgments of taste must be based on one's own free response to the object itself; in this way they express individual autonomy. The project of theories of natural law⁵⁵ gradually became one of justifying the public interest of a society of possessive individuals apart from the state: a theory of civil society. However, to claim universal agreement, they must be based on cognitive capacities shared by all, yet by a condition of those faculties that is pleasurable because it is not constrained by rules. Such a state is one of 'free play' between imagination and understanding. Thus judgments of taste may have the 'quantity' of universality and the 'modality' of necessity while retaining the 'quality' of independence from direct moral interest and 'relation' to merely subjective, cognitive

⁵³ Ibid., p. 34.

⁵⁴ For Kant man in nature is primitive and barbarous. For this he needs to educate himself. But this is not pathologic process but heuristic. Hitherto human being have not set up civilisation in which man is seen as an end to himself.

⁵⁵ Hobbes' definition of natural rights in *The Elements* run: "And that which is not against reason, men call right, or just, or blameless liberty of using our natural power and ability. It is therefore a right of nature: that every man may preserve his own life and lives, with all the power he has." Hobbes, *The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic*, p. 2.

interests rather than objective, practical ones⁵⁶. The free play of understanding and imagination cannot be known intellectually but only felt. Accordingly, Kant distinguishes two modes of knowledge: one is intuitive the other is discursive. The intuitive kind consists of schematic activity by means direct demonstration of the object and of symbolic activity out of which anthropomorphism and deism emerge.

In the antinomy of taste two groups compete;

-sensationalist view argues for the beautiful which pleases without interest

-intellectualist view holds the beautiful which pleases without concepts.

Against these attitudes Kant develops mainly three arguments⁵⁷;

- Argument from value;

The intellectual side of the person is more valuable than the empirical features.

For everyone there is no value more valuable than his freedom, because freedom is the substance of the soul. The beautiful soul is the most valuable thing.

- Argument from the absurd;

To think beautiful merely in the chain of mechanical nature is absurd. This is because we cannot explain all behavior of human beings in the limits of this series.

Consequently, beautiful is also applicable to the moral features of human beings.

- Argument from the conflict;

⁵⁶ Kant gives the subject his dignity in *The Critique of Judgment*, by producing a 'free play' in which a subject can be free from concept. If the question 'why does freedom from concept provide this?' was asked the answer would be that the concept are belong to understanding. But for the satisfaction we must look to the finality of the concept.

⁵⁷ Deleuze, *Kant's Critical Philosophy*, p.1.

Reason is not merely a faculty of means. In the sublime it helps understanding to see its limits. Thus, it demands respect for the principles of reason.

Kant brings the sensationalist and intellectualist views into harmony by explaining the unharmonical harmony between imagination and understanding. This becomes explicit in the explanation of the sublime. Judgement is a middle term between understanding and reason⁵⁸.

Has it also got independent a priori principles ? If so, are they constitutive, or are they merely regulative thus indicating no special realm ? "It is only in the practical sphere that reason can prescribe laws; in respect of theoretical knowledge (of nature) it can only (as by the understanding advised in the law) deduce from given laws their logical consequences, which still always remain restricted to nature."⁵⁹ It was shown in the first *Critique* that it is possible to think without contradiction of both this jurisdictions, since the objections were disposed of by detecting the dialectical illusions of the appropriate faculties. However, by this the passage is not provided between the two faculties but only the gap is fixed.

There must therefore, be a ground of the unity of the supersensible that lies at the basis of nature, with what the concept of freedom contains in a practical way, and although the concept of this ground neither theoretically nor practically attains to a knowledge of it, and so has no peculiar realm of its own, still it renders possible the transition from the mode of thought according to the principles of the one to that according to the principles of the other.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ C. J., p. IV.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. XII.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. XIV

Here Kant progresses by analogy between the faculties since judgement has no field of objects appropriate to it. Its principle, upon which laws are sought, is subjective a priori. The corresponding faculty of judgement is pleasure just as for understanding it is knowledge and for reason it is pleasure or displeasure. Judgement in general is the faculty of thinking the particular as contained under the universal. If the universal is given then the judgement is determinant. If the particular is given and the universal has to be found for it, then the judgement is simply reflective.

The reflective judgement stands in need of a principle. This principle it cannot borrow from experience, because what it has to do is to establish just the unity of all empirical principles under higher principles. Such a transcendental principle, therefore, the reflective judgement, can only give as a law from and to itself. This faculty gives by this a law to itself alone and not to nature.

The concept of an object, so far as it contains at the same time the ground of the actuality of this object, is called its end. And the agreement of a thing with that constitution of things which is only possible according to ends, is called the finality of its form. Accordingly, the principle of judgement, in respect of the form of the things of nature under empirical laws generally, is the finality of nature in its multiplicity. The finality of nature is, therefore, a particular a priori concept, which has its origin solely in the reflective judgement. Technique of nature⁶¹ consists in judging natural objects as if their possibility rested on art. Technique of nature is not a category and is distinguished

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 8

from the nomothetic of nature which consists in bringing nature under the laws of the understanding.

In judgement of taste the agent is imagination by corresponding the concept an intuition. Natural beauty may be looked on as the presentation of the concept of the formal, i.e. merely subjective finality, and natural ends as the presentation of the concept of the real, i.e. objective finality⁶² (We estimate these concepts through understanding and reason respectively.)

The resistance is not between nature and freedom, but between the former as a phenomenon and the effects of the latter as phenomena in the world of sense⁶³. The effect of the concept of freedom is the final end which is to exist, and this presupposes the condition of the possibility of that end in nature (i.e. in the nature of the subject as a being of the sensible world, namely, as man) It is presupposed a priori by judgement, and without regard to the practical. This faculty, with its concept of a finality of nature, provides us with the mediating concept between theoretical and practical reason. Judgement by the a priori principle of its estimation of nature according to its possible particular laws provides the noumenon with determinability⁶⁴ through the intellectual faculty. And only after this operation of the faculty of judgement reason gives determination to the same a priori by its practical law.

⁶² Ibid., XXXIV.

⁶³ Ibid., XXXVII

⁶⁴ Kant thereby suggests that our empirical knowledge is neither passively received nor simply guaranteed, but dependent on our active projection of the unity of nature.

The search for communicability leads Kant to the supreme intelligence (God) to show an objective power as the source of the unity of the world since human reason cannot represent the world immediately as a whole in its actual process. The world is ordered "as if it had originated in the plan of a supreme reason."⁶⁵ Here the heuristic attitude completes its process. Hence, Kant produces intellectual intuition for God.⁶⁶ This is because if our understanding were intuitive it would have no object but such as are actual. For this Kant makes a difference, which is valid subjectively for human understanding, between the possibility of things (understanding for conceptions) and the actuality of things (sensuous intuition for the corresponding objects). After the union of ideas of reason Kant begins to search for a unity in the world of phenomena. Kant inquires this subject in the second part of the third *Critique* under the name of teleological judgment. Thus, at last Kant satisfies himself by synthesizing these two regions by a final end working intentionally, and in an interested way. This is because, the final unity of the phenomena refers to an understanding which is capable of serving as its principle or substratum, in which the representation of the whole would be the cause of the whole itself as an effect⁶⁷.

Hence the finality of nature for our cognitive faculties and their employment, which manifestly radiates from them, is a transcendental principle of judgments, and so needs also a transcendental deduction. This transcendental concept of a finality of nature is neither a concept of nature nor of freedom. This is because finality of nature attributes

⁶⁵ C. P. R. A 686

⁶⁶ For Kant "teleology must look to a theology for a complete answer to its inquiries" C. .J. prg. 74

nothing at all to the object, i.e. to nature but only represents the unique mode in which we must proceed in our reflection upon the objects of nature with a view to getting a thoroughly interconnected whole of experience, and so is a subjective principle, i.e. maxim of judgement⁶⁸. The need of the end of all conditional series is necessary for the possibility of the finality of nature and this faculty is no other than the faculty of judgement and this is supplied analogically by a supreme intelligence. The adaptation of nature to our cognitive faculties is presupposed a priori by judgement on behalf of its reflection upon it according to empirical laws. But by a finality in respect of the subject's faculty of cognition understanding recognizes nature objectively as contingent.

The most interesting feature of the judgement of taste is that in the feeling of the sublime there is a contradiction between sense and concept. This contradiction is solved by a subreption of nature into the moral law, by the idea of humanity.

Objective finality is either external, i.e. the utility, or internal, i.e. the perfection of the object. The two are reconciled in civilization that is the end of men.

Let us define the meaning of 'an end' in transcendental terms (i.e. without presupposing anything empirical, such as the feeling of pleasure). An end is the object of a concept so far as this concept is regarded as the cause of the object (the real ground of its possibility); and the causality of a concept in respect of its Object is finality (*forma finalis*)⁶⁹

'Confused concept'⁷⁰ is created when beauty is reduced to the concept of perfection. In morality this confused concept is reversed into a universally valid and agreeable one.

⁶⁷ Ibid., prg. 75.

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. XXIII.

⁶⁹ Ibid., P. 61.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 71.

The term 'aesthetic judgement' is not applicable to the faculty of intuition, which cannot 'judge' but which simply supplies a manifold in intuition. From this position Kant accuses Baumgarten's aesthetic of confusing the perceptual and the judgemental aesthetic, and of confusing sense and understanding. At this point we can see the importance of Kant's own shift of emphasis from the aesthetic perfectionism of *The Logic* to judgement here in the *Critique*. Here the division between intellect and sensation is needed to find a place for imagination.

If one wants pleasure and displeasure to be nothing but mere cognition of objects by the understanding (which may be conscious but not of its concepts), and (also) wants them to appear to us merely as sensations, one would have to call this kind of judgement not aesthetic (sensuous) but intellectual; the senses would be basically nothing but a judging understanding (albeit not fully conscious of its own actions), the aesthetic mode of representation would not be specifically differentiated from the logical, and thus, since the boundary between the two could not be drawn with precisising, this diversity of terminology would be entirely useless.⁷¹

Kant makes use of perfectionist theory of aesthetics by the idea of purposefulness without purpose (*Zweckmässigkeit ohne Zweck*). Perfection is finality with an 'end', the 'end' or concept being the perfect unity of a manifold. Kant aims perfection in person and in society. There are two elements in perfection, "which in their harmonious union make up perfection in itself, namely, manifoldness and unity."⁷²

In *The Logic* Kant offers a table of the moments of the perfection of aesthetics which formally correspond to the table of the moments of the judgements of taste forming the Analytic of the Beautiful or first part of *The Critique of Judgement*. The first

⁷¹ Kant, *First Introduction* to C. J., tr. by James Haden, p. 30.

⁷² Kant, *The Logic*, p. 44.

moment in *The Logic* is quantity which consists in the applicability of a cognition to a multitude of objects; The second is quality or the distinction in intuition of an abstract concept presented in concreto.; the third is relation wherein the perfection of aesthetic truth lies in the subjective agreement of the object with the 'laws of sense'; the fourth and final moment of aesthetic perfection is modality and consists in aesthetic intensity.

Later Kant discards this approach along with the table of the moments of perfection of aesthetics in favor of his 'theory of the harmony' of imagination and understanding. The first moment of quality⁷³ in *The Critique of Judgement* comes to rest upon the disinterestedness of a judgement of taste; quantity rests on the universality of a judgement; relation upon its formal finality; and modality upon its necessity.

The attainment of every aim is coupled with a feeling of pleasure. Now where such attainment has for its condition a representation, a priori the feeling of pleasure, also is determined by a ground which is a priori and valid for all man⁷⁴. That subjective side of a representation which is incapable of becoming an element of cognition, is the pleasure or displeasure connected with it; for through it I cognize nothing in the object of the representation, although it may easily be the result of the operation of some cognition or other⁷⁵. In this respect it is like the ideas of reason by analogy. The object is then called beautiful⁷⁶; and the faculty of judging by means of such a pleasure is called taste. The judgement of taste in fact only lays claim (it is not demonstrable, like

⁷³ Kant, *First Introduction* to C. J., tr. by. James Haden, p. 41.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p XXVI.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p XXX.

the postulates of practical reason) , like every other empirical judgement, to be valid for every one, and, despite its inner contingency this is always possible⁷⁷.

Susceptibility to pleasure not only indicates a finality on the part of objects in their relation to the reflective judgement in the subject but also a finality on the part of the subject, answering to the concept of freedom, in respect of the form, or even formlessness, of object. So, aesthetic judgement refers also to the sublime⁷⁸ springing from a higher intellectual feeling. The role of sublime is needed to set the transition from the mere theoretical and passive subject to the moral and active agent.

In the statement “This rose is beautiful” reason seems to have no role but understanding and imagination. In the sublime it is as if imagination were confronted with its own limits. This is mathematical sublime of the immense because there is a measureless quantity. It is reason that forces us to unite the immensity of the sensible world into a whole.

Reason leads imagination to its limits and shows that its power is nothing in comparison to an idea. This is the dynamic sublime of power because reason animates in the soul a desire. In sublime there is a direct subjective relationship between imagination and reason. The mathematical sublime is a dissension rather than an accord, pain rather than pleasure. We can call this a discordant accord of imagination and reason. In the

⁷⁶ The experience of beauty is also a symbol of morality, precisely because the freedom of the imagination that is its essence is the only experience in which any form of freedom, including the freedom of the will itself, can become palpable to us.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. XXXII.

⁷⁸ Until the fulfillment of his salvation from the threats of nature by overwhelming the feeling of sublime and turning to the society for the revelation of his hidden potency man is not yet real men, free.

accord between the disharmonic faculties, understanding and imagination, dynamical sublime, the soul is felt as the indeterminate supersensible unity of all faculties. This is engendered in the dissension. This is why the common sense which corresponds to the feeling of the sublime is inseparable from a culture as the movement of its genesis.⁷⁹

Kant reconciles of freedom and necessity in the concept of 'culture' presented in part two of the C.J., and show how it corresponds with his reconciliation of taste and aesthetics in Part One. 'Culture' is for Kant a synthesis of individual freedom and a strong constitution, a fusion of the ideologies of civil society and absolutism.*

Kant concludes his critique of aesthetic judgment with the remarkable suggestion that it is in our enjoyment of beauty that our vocation⁸⁰ as autonomous agents becomes not just a 'fact of reason' but a matter of experience⁸¹ as well. Now man creates the beauty⁸² itself in experience by his action analogically .

The relation between common sense and aesthetic attitude is explicit in the fact that "the pigs face is the wrong shape for the facial expressions which go with ordinary conversation. So we send pigs to slaughter with equanimity, but form societies for the

⁷⁹ C. J., prg. 29

⁸⁰ Against the absurdity of an irrational answer to why do we conduct according to good ? Kant makes use of teleology by saying: "Why our nature should be furnished with a propensity to consciously vain desires is a teleological problem of anthropology."

⁸¹ That experience is lived through the free play between understanding and imagination. And it does not changes between the converted worlds of the gourmet and of philistine.

⁸² "If the Jews had confronted Christianity with a mockery instead of suffering it they would have been giving them more pain than that of today's scene." (Shaftesbury, *Essays on the Freedom of Wit and Humour*). When we feel disgust against a thing or take it as a mockery we do not afraid of its absence and we reduce it directly in the limits of a categorical usage. But if we feel beauty and happiness for something then it raises a will in us for the object's reproduction in us and we make our world united with it.

protection of koalas”⁸³ For this the sense of taste brings responsibility with itself. This leads to an ethical understanding. In every subject this mood brings another interpretation of the world. That responsibility by its authentic interpretation of the world⁸⁴ makes the person an original being.⁸⁵ Then the absurdity from the futility of ethical principles disconnected from the empirical world changes into a hope that promise a new world. In civil society a person “has completely abandoned his wild lawless freedom in order to find his whole freedom again undiminished in a lawful dependency⁸⁶, that is, in a juridical state of society.”⁸⁷

“All culture and art which adorn mankind...are the fruits of their unsociability”⁸⁸ For Kant the relation of art to moral ideas is necessary because without this “the soul is dull the art is distasteful.”⁸⁹ Taste makes possible the transition from the charm of sense to an habitual moral interest “without too violent a leap.”⁹⁰ In Kant’s aesthetics the feeling of squeamishness is not created by the artwork. This feeling is symbolically applied when we criticize others’ sense of taste. Kant relates knowledge essentially to its

⁸³ Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of the Nature*, p. 190.

⁸⁴ The theory of art and of culture which run in parallel lines in Kant, are united by Schelling and Schopenhauer, in whose theories the political tension between freedom and necessity is resolved through presenting culture as a work of art.

⁸⁵ Kant finds authentic interpretation of the world expressed allegorically in the story of Job as the symbol of responsibility, probity and uprightness. *On the Failure of All Philosophical Attempts at Theodicy*, in *The Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*

⁸⁶ On this basis we can understand the possibility of evil. *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals* II.; by this Kant refutes the essentialist view on the nature of human and Rousseau’s thesis on the evil of civilization.

⁸⁷ Kant, *The Metaphysical Elements of Justice*, p. 26

⁸⁸ Kant, *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose*. p. 22, p. 46.

⁸⁹ C. J. prg. 52

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, prg. 59

communicability between humans, and thus to the social spirit of mankind. Only the cultural ends of reason can be described as absolutely final⁹¹.

Production of the work of art in its communicative power substantiates the labor that have been paid by the agent. This labor⁹² in general is directed to reveal the implanted nature of man. This shows in the mean time the competitive process among the citizens.⁹³ Because taste is no more closed to critical activity. Taste is the source of hope for the civilization as a product of 'beautiful soul'.⁹⁴

⁹¹ Ibid., prg. 84.

⁹² Ibid., prg. 303.

⁹³ By this ramified derivations we can see that Kant is a typical liberal theorist.

⁹⁴ C. J., prg. 300.

4. 2. Kant's Aesthetics Remains Deductive

We can be in an illusion and there can be no relation between our beliefs and the principles around which our life revolves. As in the case of Kant the relation between rights of understanding and the ideas of reason cannot be abridged logically. For Kant this gap remains the scandal of philosophy.

I suggest that Kant's aesthetics remains deductive and is the hangover of finite - infinite opposition. Considered as a whole, Kant's philosophy is "an investigation of the finite intellect"⁹⁵. Because in finite intellect all the series of phenomena are completed and the justification of ideas of reason is reached. The faculties of this kind of intellect constitute our judgements concerning 'what we know', 'what we ought to do', and 'what is beautiful'. Kant tried to find necessary and a priori conditions for these judgements in order to assert their universal validity.

In order to be considered universally valid, this satisfaction must have an a priori principle. Consequently, it is a satisfaction in the agreement of the subjects' pleasure with the feeling of everyone else according to a universal law, which must spring from the reason. In other words, choice in terms of this satisfaction comes, according to its form, under the principle of duty.⁹⁶

In his pre-critical theory of art Kant tried to synthesize morality (British theory) and legality (German perfectionism). In order to achieve a synthesis Kant resorted to a third

⁹⁵ Hegel, *Faith and Knowledge*, 69.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.111.

term, most notably the 'general will' taken from Rousseau, which operated through the means of the moral sense to direct action toward the end of perfection.

To justify the possibility of synthetic a priori judgements of taste I shall understand, the opposition of the agreeable and the perfect, and the attempt to make feeling analogous to a concept, and the epistemological and moral deductions.

The Critique of Judgement attempts to answer the question; what constitutes the universality and necessity of judgements of taste? Synthetic a priori judgements of taste are universal and necessary according to a social norm. There are several deductions in *The Critique of Judgement*, each similar in that they appeal to a theory of society, and attempt to give the judgement a normative ground. Kant's ideas remain determined⁹⁷ in his philosophy as in *The Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant still remains deductive in his practical philosophy and aesthetic philosophy.

Kant did begin from the very 'point of union' between form and content, concept and manifold. His theory of the original synthesis of the manifold contained the 'middle term' that he needed; Reason itself was here 'immersed' and hence unrecognized. Because he did not recognize it, Kant had to replace Reason by 'practical faith' in a 'noumenal world'. The unity and being became an ideal, a Sollen.⁹⁸

Hegel informs that "On the contrary, the sole Idea that has reality and true objectivity for philosophy, is the absolute presence of the antitheses."⁹⁹ Not the noumenon against the world of appearance. If we follow Kant we would have no actual base for the morality. A judgement that has intersubjective validity turn into being a common sense only

⁹⁷ "It is the business of philosophy to analyze concepts which are given confusedly, to explain them in detail and make them determinate." Kant, *Selected Pre-Critical Writings*, p. 8.

⁹⁸ Introduction to *Faith and Knowledge*, p. 25.

through morality. According to Hegel, Kant's answer to the question expresses the identity of the subject and the predicate of the judgement in a priori.¹⁰⁰ If it is so then the work of productive imagination is determined and constructed by a supreme faculty.

Kant's subjective judgement remains a transcendental subjectivity or rather a naturalist subjective judgement. Since Kant takes the antithesis as absolute and assumed the eternal as inconceivable, the infinite and the finite is absolutely opposed. Hence, ideality is conceived only as the concept. This is the idealism of the finite. For Hegel it is clear that "if infinity is thus set up against finitude, each is as finite as the other"¹⁰¹. Kant reduces ideas to the level of concepts in *The Critique of Judgement*. Hegel recovers old significance of the ideas by relating them to the life of the reality.

The Idea is true infinity of life, an infinity that is not, like the concept, essentially opposed to the finite. It does not exist simply as a thought or concept to be reflected on by the finite consciousness. It is an infinity that contains the finite, a concept that involves existence, an ideal that is the life of the real¹⁰²

Reason 'immersed in finitude', 'affected by sensibility' or 'as impulse and instinct' will not be able to think the eternal¹⁰³.

Once subject and object have been separated, the judgement reappears doubled on the subjective and objective side. On the objective side it appears as transition from one objective fact to another, these objectivities themselves being posited in the relation of subject and object, and in that of the identity of the both; and on the subjective side it appears likewise as a transition from one subjective phenomenon to another. Imagination is the subjective which qua subjective or particular is Ego and qua objective or universal is experience¹⁰⁴

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 68

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 69

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 63

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 16

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 65

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 75

We see the difference between noumenology and phenomenology here in its full fledged appearance. The work of art shines¹⁰⁵ and demands agreement between subjects. 'Scheinen' is a highly appropriate word to express that highly ambiguous and illusive phenomenon, beauty. Because there is no knowledge of beauty but a judgement on it as the result of reflection.

When Kant requires that the validity of aesthetic judgement should hold for everybody then subjective aesthetic judgement is rendered objective by the notion of supreme plan of divine intelligence. So far there is no noumenon in art. Although there was no passage to the noumenon in *The Critique of Pure Reason*, here Kant believed that he arrived at a legal passage between theoretical and practical philosophy by the mediation of the aesthetic judgement.

The root of aesthetic judgement goes to the dialectic¹⁰⁶ of the teleological judgement. At last in *The Critique of the Teleological Judgement* Kant reaches an 'intuitive' (aesthetic)¹⁰⁷ clearness through the divine intellect. By the symbolic mediation of the intellectual intuition Kant provides a logical clarity of the ground of

¹⁰⁵ *Scheinen* (to shine) has two quiet distinct meanings, 'to shine', and 'to appear or seem.' "In the eighteenth century in and out of aesthetic contexts, *Schein* was variously identified with both *Erscheinung* (appearance) and *Täuschung* (deception or illusion). Kant puts a strict distinction between the two and uses the latter as the German equivalent of the Greek 'phenomenon' opposed to 'noumenon'." Schiller, *On the Aesthetic Education of Man*, p. 328.

¹⁰⁶ Socrates himself had called dialectical discussion the greatest human good (Plato, *Apology*, 38 a) In Plato's *Meno* the sublime that is the divine reached through dialectic reflection that is phronesis. (97 a) That is the logos common to everyone, and not possessed subjectively as Sophists claim. And here Poets, and good citizens (99 d) like Solon resembles to the genius of Kant. For they "have the breath of God." It is not vain that Kant mentions Plato as his first teacher. *Analytic of Teleological Judgement* p. 8 in the C. J.

¹⁰⁷ As regards clearness Kant separates two kind of clearness that are "...in the first place a discursive (logical) clearness through concepts, and secondly, an intuitive (aesthetic) clearness, through intuitions..." C.P.R. p. 12.

aesthetic judgement for every subject. In its practical side *The Logic* is the work for exploring or making a way that persuades everyone to the rightness and validity of passing from one state to another one. That demands an objective observation that is followed by the design of the way. This design is made or found. Who makes this design is the genius, who finds it is the apprentice, and who follows it without understanding its path is the servant and who knows nothing of the existence of this general way is the philistine.

Kant's logic is transcendental because all experience is consummated in the limits of reason. By the clarity of the limits of this reason we pursue the source of all kinds of judgements. This transcendental logic consists of analytic and dialectic judgement. Analytic judgement resolves formal procedures of the understanding and reason into their elements. As for Kant's dialectic, it is a 'critique of dialectical illusion' and not an art of producing such illusion¹⁰⁸ dogmatically (an art unfortunately very commonly practiced by metaphysical jugglers¹⁰⁹). The illusion is not simply born of the sophist desire to convince but it follows from the natural and inevitable illusion in the pursuit of completeness. (C.P.R. A 297 / B353) Instead of regarding this search as the pursuit of a regulative asymptotic principle, the reason, through transcendent and dialectical inferences hypostatizes the goal of completeness into 'transcendent concepts of pure reason'. (C.P.R. A 309 / B 366) Unity is demanded or reached by the concepts of God, the world, and the subject. Through dialectic Kant tries to put these ideas in the

¹⁰⁸ Dialectic as the logic of illusion is later followed by Hegel in *The Science of Logic*.

¹⁰⁹ C.P.R. 68 / B 88.

certain path of sciences. Theology as the science of the God, cosmology as of the world, and psychology of the soul.

As a result, finitude is thought of in relation to the ideas of reason that are absolute references. It is by reference to these supposed, yet unproved divine ideas that human knowledge is said to be limited and that the mark of this limit, sensibility, is relativized so that aesthetics can never truly free itself and become autonomous from logic and metaphysics. By this form aesthetic judgement remains a consequence of deduction.

4. 3. Kant's Aesthetics Ends In Anthropology

Kant's aesthetics is a reversed *Critique of Pure Reason*. The illusion is recognized in the very beginning of Kant's aesthetics. For the aesthetic judgement to be conventionally recognized neither's personal judgements is assented but of anthropologic. Universality is reached not through reason but through human nature. Kant's study ends in the anthropologic logic in which aesthetic judgment becomes universal for all. The process of materialization of nature's ends installed in the fate of human being. Although aesthetics is kept far from the realm of violence, it is forced by another factor that is the conception of a certain human nature. And this is through the finality of nature that is performed by a 'supreme schema'. In the theory of art Kant moves increasingly toward regarding the guarantee of the universality and necessity of a judgement of taste with reference to a social theory. He is establishing an 'anthropology' of taste, as in plain from his discussion of the relation of aesthetics and taste to society as presented in his *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Viewpoint*.

In Kant's system of moral philosophy *The Anthropology* complements the discussion of abstract morality offered by *The Critique of Practical Reason*. In Kant's theory of art the central problem is to establish the subjective universal validity of the aesthetic judgement. The validity is increasingly construed anthropologically. *The Anthropology* is thus of importance in understanding both the problem of the subjective

universal and the importance of the anthropological turn in *The Critique of Judgement*. The text of *The Anthropology From a Pragmatic Viewpoint* was published, like the logic, from Kant's lecture notes of a course which he began to give in 1772 or 1773. Thus they predate the critical philosophy. The *Anthropology* and the *Critiques* arose as responses to similar problems, central being that of the reconciliation of the empirical and transcendental. *The Anthropology* is of especial interest for a sociological reading of Kant's philosophy, since it explicitly derives cognition, practical philosophy, and taste from social life. "In civil society the individual can no longer resort to private force to achieve his ends. He must rather use his skills in dealing with other men and influence them to help him achieve his ends."¹¹⁰

The *Anthropology* is divided into two parts: the first consists of three books: on the cognitive powers, on the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and on the appetitive powers; the second part contains the largely anecdotal anthropological characterization. Book One is concerned mainly with the development of the individual consciousness. It begins by distinguishing a person from a thing through the property of self-consciousness (apperception). From self-consciousness Kant evolved three forms of egoism: logical, aesthetic, and practical. "The aesthetic egoist is a man content with his own taste...by isolating himself with his own judgement, applauding himself and seeking the touchstone of artistic beauty only within him, he prevents himself from progressing to something better."¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, p. XXIII.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p.11.

Kant opposes egotistical judgement that results in madness to a norm, idea or affinity. In this form aesthetic judgement remains transcendent and far from the common sense. The idea of the sublime is essential for Kant to make communicative an aesthetic judgement. However, the idea of the sublime to gain a universal validity accompanies an anthropologic ground.

Egotistical judgement is blind with regard to the totality of socially-validated norms of judgement. "The one universal characteristic of madness is the loss of common sense (*sensus communis*) and substitution of logical private sense (*sensus privatus*) for it."¹¹² The notion of the affinity becomes extremely important in the light of the vast significance accorded to the reconciliation of the imagination and understanding in *The Critique of Judgement*. In *The Anthropology*:

By affinity I mean the connection of the manifold by virtue of its origin from one ground...whether in silent thought or in conversation, there must always be a theme on which the manifold is strung, so that the understanding too must be operative on it. In such a case the play of imagination still follows the law of sensibility, which provides the material, and this is associated without consciousness of the rule but still in keeping with it. So the association is carried out in conformity with understanding, though it is not derived from understanding.¹¹³

The affinity orders the fancy of judgement, and is rule governed, although in an obscure, indirect way. The operation of the affinity, or as it is also called, the 'idea' may be formulated as the rules of an art:

Yet every art needs certain mechanical basic rules – rules, namely, for making the work suit the idea underlying it, for portraying truthfully the object that the artist has in mind...To free imagination from even this constraint and let

¹¹² Ibid., p. 88.

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 52.

individual talent carry on without rules and revel in itself, even against nature, might produce original folly.¹¹⁴

An egoistic reliance upon imagination without a norm, idea, or affinity results in madness rather than a work of art. In *The Critique of Judgement* the affinity is identified as a social norm, and the work of art is the unity of individual freedom of expression and the social norm. The production of art synthesizes individual freedom of imagination and the affinity or norm. Thus, Kant relates taste directly to social life;

But the universal validity of this pleasure for everyone, which distinguishes tasteful choice (of the beautiful) from choice in terms of mere sensations (of what is merely subjectively pleasing) – that is, of the agreeable – involves the concept of a law; for only according to a law can the validity of pleasure for the man who judges it be universal. And since the power of representing the universal is understanding, the judgement of taste is not only an aesthetic judgement but a judgement of understanding as well; but we think of it as a union of both (and so do not consider the judgement of understanding as pure). – To judge an object by taste is to judge whether freedom in the play of imagination harmonizes or clashes with the lawfulness of the understanding.¹¹⁵

Now as a critique of Kant I try to explain how Kant arrives at anthropology through the analysis of the sublime. These prethoughts affect later Kant; thus, the philosophy found in *The Critique of Teleological Judgement* ends in anthropology.

This development toward a theory of art justified by a theory of society underlies the oft-noted turn between the first and the third *Critiques* from abstract to an ‘anthropological’ subject. This attempts to establish a norm through a social theory of subjective universality, an aspect of the early attempt to develop a universality of feeling

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p. 93

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 108.

is expressed in this passage from *The Logic*, which intimates a social theory of aesthetic universality.

Since logic, as a science a priori or as a doctrine, must be taken to be a canon of the use of the understanding and of reason, it differs essentially from aesthetic, which as a mere critique of taste has no canon (law) but only a norm (model, or standard of judging) which consists in general agreement.¹¹⁶

The very distinction of the beautiful and the sublime embodies both aspects of the ambiguous observer: the observation and the reflection. The one is immediate, the other mediated; the beautiful implies 'immediate impulse', the sublime reflected consideration.

In his theory of genuine virtue presented in *The Observations*, Kant has developed an argument for the universality of feeling. The just society would be one in which each followed his feeling for the whole of humanity. In *The Observations* this absolute principle is named as a universal affection:

When universal affection towards the human species has become a principle within you to which you always subordinate your actions, then love toward the needy one still remains; but now, from a higher standpoint, it has been placed in its true relation to your total duty. Universal affection is the ground of your interest in his plight, but also of the justice by whose rule you must forbear this action. Now as soon as this feeling has arisen in its proper universality it has become 'sublime', but also colder.¹¹⁷

Kant himself was unconvinced by the 'abstract anthropology', "We feel within us a 'voice of nature' which says: that is noble and just; therefore it is a duty to do it."¹¹⁸ This abstract anthropology could have been destructed by the idea of the sublime.

¹¹⁶ Kant, *The Logic*, p. 17.

¹¹⁷ Kant, *Observations of the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime*, p. 58

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.70

Everything goes past like a river and the changing taste and various shapes of men make the whole game uncertain and delusive. Where do I find fixed points in nature which cannot be moved by man, and where can I indicate the makers on the shore to which he ought to adhere ?¹¹⁹

In the case of the sublime the subject that encounters immense measure cannot conceptualize it with his understanding. This is the mathematical and the subject feels only pain that derives from the non-intersubjectivity of the sublime case. Here imagination becomes free to find a solution to the expression of the sublime throughout which we can limit an hitherto-unexplored nomadic side of our nature. By the help of imagination understanding makes sociable the feeling of sublime. Kant draws a fundamental distinction between the beautiful and the sublime. Beauty pleases us through the free play of imagination and understanding. In our response to the sublime, however - which for Kant is not paradigmatically a response to art, but to the vastness of nature - we enjoy not a direct harmony between imagination and understanding, which are rather frustrated by their inability to grasp such immensities, but a grasp of them which reveals the power of reason within us (C.J. 5: 257). And this, although it would seem to involve theoretical reason, symbolizes the power of practical reason, and thus the foundation of our autonomy, in two ways: our power to grasp a truly universal law, such as the moral law, and our power to resist the threats of mere nature, and thus the blandishments of inclination. Thus by the symbolization of good in the aesthetic judgement Kant sets a bridge between morality and intellect.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., p.73

Imagination does this by consulting to the ideas of reason. By such free play between understanding and imagination reason consoles the gap opened there. Now for the beautiful as a common soul we have to apply with ideas of reason. But from where comes these universal at least common principles of reason. Kant claims that they comes from our human nature that constitutes our ends in the finality of the nature. So finality of nature needs another intellect apart from transcendental human one. Now for the possibility and actuality of the world Kant presupposes a divine intellect. By this Kant favors theism.

According to Kant, sensibility is passive receptivity, in which the manifold of empirical phenomena constitute the objects of possible experience, under the pure forms of space and time.¹²⁰ Perception is possible through time and space that are considered in the intuition in the third *Critique* it is widened to the intuition of the divine intellect as the intellectual intuition of the subject through which it's the subject has an objective validity to which everyone access symbolically. Now there is no need for an ontological equivalence but for a symbolical equivalence.

Do not sensibility and understanding, the two branches of human knowledge, spring from one common root, though unknown to us, the sensibility giving the objects (How is the beautiful then possible with the finality of the object that is conceived in the subjective reflection, if we do not know the root of sensible objects ? This question is answered by the divine intellect.) this unknown root, and the understanding thinking (understanding, conceiving) them ? Why such a violent and unauthorized divorce of that which nature has joined together ? Will not this dichotomy or cleavage of their transcendental root cause both branches to dry up and wither away ?¹²¹

¹²⁰ C. P. R., A 19, B 33.

¹²¹ Hamann, "A Review of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*", p. 210.

As the principle of society the principle of taste has the same origin with morality:

Firstly, there is the supersensible in general, without further determination, as substrate of nature; secondly, the same supersensible as principle of the subjective finality of nature for our cognitive faculties; thirdly, the same supersensible again as principle of the ends of freedom, and principle of the common accord of those ends with freedom in the moral sphere.¹²²

The supersensible is summoned forth to reconcile freedom and necessity, individual judgement and the collective reason, but operates, as Kant says, 'in an intimate and obscure manner.'¹²³ The unification of the general and the particular is utterly inexplicable and reflective.

Through an unknowable supersensible (nature) individual feeling and the form of law are united as the judgement of taste. Like taste culture is the unity of individual freedom and social law. Culture is the result of the operations of an unknowable 'nature'. In the neglected second part of *The Critique* Kant attempted to fuse the two theories of society in his idea of 'culture'. "The production in a rational being of an aptitude for any ends whatever of his own choosing, consequently the aptitude of a being in his freedom, is culture"¹²⁴ For the majority culturalization is a state of oppression, with hard work and little enjoyment. "With the lower classes they arise by force of domination from without, with the upper from seeds of discontent within."¹²⁵ This conflict is from the development of natural tendencies so its the realization of the ends of human race.

¹²² C. J., p. 215.

¹²³ Ibid., p. 224.

¹²⁴ Ibid., p. 94.

¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 95.

The formal condition under which nature can alone attain this real end is the existence of a constitution so regulating the mutual relations of men that the abuse of freedom by individuals striving against one another is opposed by a lawful authority centered in a whole called a civil society.¹²⁶

Kant is forced to unite morality and legality in the concept 'norm'. It let him to suppose an irrational supersensible which is only reflectively in a subject possible. I agree with Hannah Arendt that the first part of *The Critique of Judgement* contains the greatest and most original aspects of Kant's philosophy.¹²⁷

In his first two *Critiques* Kant does not give a rational answer to the question: Why is good must be preferable for the men ? The need of the end of all conditional series is necessary for the possibility of the finality of nature and this faculty is no other than the faculty of judgement. Kant justifies God¹²⁸ by his intellectual intuition because if our understanding were intuitive it would have no object but such as are actual. For the existence of the universe working spontaneously through which freedom is possible an intellectual intuition possessed by a divine intellect was necessary. For this Kant makes difference, that is valid subjectively for human understanding, between the possibility of things (understanding for conceptions) and the actuality of things (sensuous intuition for the corresponding objects). To reach this idea is not objective for all subjects, this is to be reached by analogy, and by reflection not by constructive thinking. This can be managed by those genius that make an immensity communicable. By this he conceptualize the world-soul, and provides unity in the realm of subjects.

¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 96.

¹²⁷ Arendt, *Between Past and Future*, p. 219.

¹²⁸ "Teleology must look to a theology for a complete answer to its inquiries" C. J., prg. 74.

Kant is a groundbreaker in his leaving aside the belief that says "*de gustibus non disputandum est.*"

Pleasure from the moral law seems to be absurd but if it springs from the faculty of taste it becomes understandable. "...the pleasure in the beautiful is...as Kant puts it, the promise of a sentimental community, *sensus communis*, of the subject with itself and also with others."¹²⁹ This is the task of genius that criticize the ages' taste and offers a more preferable taste. With Kant the age of education¹³⁰ begins. In his aesthetics we witness this by the "propaedeutic for establishing (good) taste consists in the development of moral (*Sittlicher*) ideas and the cultivation of moral feeling."(C. J 356) The process of civilization is resembled to the artwork because in art "we make real a preconceived concept of an object which is a purpose for us" (C. J. 192).

"By right it is only production through freedom, i.e. through an act of will that places reason at the basis of its action, that should be termed art." (C. J. 303) For the basis of men's labor is formed by the rational deliberation. Kant finds his consolation (the union of the faculties) in the artwork because it is the effect of a causality according to ideas¹³¹. Reconciliation with God for hope that divine grace will bring the artwork to its consummation is the final level of moral perfection. The analogy makes possible to

¹²⁹ Lyotard, *The Inhuman*, p. 33.

¹³⁰ This theme is not new for example "the two main components of the early education of the guardians in the Republic, gymnastic and music, are focussed primarily on the child's feelings and emotions; the aim is to inculcate the right tastes and attitudes, and to form good habits of behavior." Devereux, "Socrates' Kantian Conception of Virtue"; *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, vol 17, 1979.

¹³¹ *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, vol XXIII. 1995, Munzel Kant's philosophical basis of proof for the idea of the morally-good.

see men as a God. This anthropomorphism shows symbolically that we are not God but we have a feeling arising from being like a God¹³²

About the time of Kant European philosophy was reductionist on the human feelings. Here Kant's aesthetics fills the empty principles of his duty ethics because it has always a leeway showing the men in nature and the men in civilization. In the thought of subject the panorama of the possibility of the development of civilization is put into screen. It is like a drama brought to be written by its agent that upholds the person on the Archimedean point of the world. History¹³³ is the process of the accomplishment of freedom and the good sovereign in the sensible world. Thus it implies an original synthetic activity of man. Men as moral being contains in itself the supreme end for his existence.

The possibility of the critique of taste presents the man in his judgment on his world autonomous and the civilization as an artwork of society. The age long religious meditation upon man's lowliness and sublimity, his misery and grandeur, attains its philosophical significance through what Kant calls the theme of *mundi incola Homo*: man the indweller of the world¹³⁴. Thus, the society becomes a public-legislative authority, that is, a civil society. Kant made soul out of the common sense. In this sense Kant became Moses to German nation. This is a necessary duty for the animation of the main capacities of men that features them as what they are.

¹³² In the realm of feelings there is no imitation. Every feeling is original. For this we can produce feelings from the fact that is not real. The educative property of the arts rests here. His feelings take man on a vantage point. From this original power does the risk of artwork arise because it stands on the imperfect human nature.

¹³³ C. J. prg. 83.

4. 4. Kant's Aesthetics Ends In Morality

“The whole ground will be covered by the metaphysics of nature and of morals.”¹³⁵ All Kant's aim in his studies is to prove and clarify these two grounds. However, Kant does not reach his goals “The morality of human actions can never reach its complete effectiveness here on earth during our lifetime but could reach it in a world of spirits in conformity with spiritual laws.”¹³⁶

Kant distinguish mathematics and philosophy by their mode of symbolization¹³⁷. Mathematical and geometrical symbols he believes to be in concreto, the universal is immediately expressed in a symbol. Like this the beautiful becomes symbol of the good. Kant's philosophy in the end arrives at morality even the religion that finds its object in the symbol of God consolidates itself in the ideas of reason. Kant's Philosophy from the beginning aims to perish skepticism and dogmatism. As the former is for spontaneity the later is for freedom. But this objectivity that is reached in spontaneity and in freedom is not intersubjective or communicative. Kant's philosophy neglects desire, instinct, impulse, etc. in brief the category of life.

¹³⁴ From Kant's *Opus Postumum* quoted by Collins in *The Emergence of Philosophy of Religion*.

¹³⁵ Kant, C. J., *Preface*, p. 7.

¹³⁶ Kant, *Dreams of A Spirit Seer*, pp. 51, 52.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 8, 9.

Kant seemed to find the possibility of the freedom and the spontaneity of reason in the realm of aesthetics. But his holding of the sublime soon updates the morality claimed in *The Critique of Practical Reason*. What he avoids is the life in its generic ontology¹³⁸. He presupposes a nature and returns again to this very nature itself¹³⁹ to supply a ground for his presupposed ideas of reason¹⁴⁰. For this, what Kant makes is the epistemology in the heuristic process of reason that finds its end in its starting point. But Kant has not recognized his own 'work of art'.¹⁴¹ This task¹⁴² is heralded later as the task of post-Kantian philosophy in which life appears in its full fledged 'flux'.¹⁴³

Kant tried to make the ultimate duality be absorbed by an ultimate one, because the contrast of appearance and essence, of phenomenon and noumenon, of things-for-us and things-in-themselves is no longer ethically determined and interpreted, but instead it is understood by the critique of taste logically, ontologically, cosmologically, and theologically.

Consequently in Kant's system the essence is opposed to the appearance as the ideal to the real or as the goal to the process or as the 'ought' to the 'is'. Both are not

¹³⁸ "Then in the final stage of its development, Kant's philosophy establishes the highest idea as a postulate which is supposed to have a necessary subjectivity, but not that absolute objectivity which would get it recognized as the only starting point of philosophy and its sole content instead of being the point where philosophy terminates in faith." (Hegel probably means to refer to *The Religion Within The Bounds of Reason Alone* (1793) Book II, section 1, subsections B and C (Akad.VI, 62-78). But compare also *Critique of Practical Reason*, I (1787), Book II, chapter II, section V (Akad. V, 124-32) Hegel *Faith and Knowledge*, p. 67.

¹³⁹ Kant shifts from critique to hypocrisy because Kant presupposes a nature by which his philosophy becomes anthropology.

¹⁴⁰ God, immortality, soul.

¹⁴¹ i.e. Subjective idealism, intellectual intuition by the supposition of divine intelligence.

¹⁴² On the 6th January 1795 Schelling writes to Hegel: "Philosophy is not yet finished. Kant gave us the results, but the premises are still missing. Who can understand results without premises?"

¹⁴³ Hegel., *Self Consciousness, The Phenomenology of Mind*, p. 226,

inwardly and absolutely united in the ultimate One, whether it is called idea or reason. This One by itself and with itself could finally unite all the opposites and all distinctions; it could be the unity of concepts and being, of idea and reality, of knowledge and will. Such a solution would be anathema to Kant.

'Ethical phenomenalism' denies the possibility of an absolute system, since the moral will denies its truth. There is no ultimate reconciliation in Kant's worldview because there is an everlasting striving and acting. It is true that C. J. by uniting the opposites of nature and mind, of necessity and freedom, provides at least a measure of such a philosophy. In the last of the great *Critiques* Kant, to a certain extent, accomplishes what appears to be a metaphysical synthesis embracing the products of analytical thinking. The beautiful and the organic represent this synthesis. Kant deals with both in the C. J. from one and the same point of view. It was this work which inspired first Schelling and later Hegel and encouraged them to create their synthetic systems. Within the frame of Kant's worldview, however, even the C. J. does not alter the primacy of ethical thought and the triumph of the analytical method. It was Schelling who abandoned the ethical phenomenalism and tried to replace it with his naturalistic aestheticism. The idea suggested by Kant that works of art as well as the creatures of organic nature represents the unity underlying the contrast between appearances and essence, or between object and subject, found in Schelling an enthusiastic and original defender. He was fascinated by the possibility of unifying the two spheres of Kant's worldview by means of a speculative philosophy of art, and he dared to articulate this bold metaphysical vision.

Kant, on the contrary, never yielded to any such temptation. Although he agrees that the masterpiece and the organism (teleology of nature, finality of nature, ends of man) provide a bridge between the separated realms of nature and mind, he insists, nevertheless, that this bridge does not really unify them. Instead, art and the organic are themselves separated from nature and mind in that they form a third realm distinct from the other two. Although the aesthetics of the beautiful and the teleology of the organic do offer a synthesis of what is separated in science and morality, this synthesis has neither the power nor the right to claim metaphysical truth. Ethical dualism and phenomenalism still stand as the final word. Neither art nor life enables us to know the hidden ground of nature and mind – that ultimate essence which would explain and produce its own appearance. On the contrary, both the artistic work and the organic being belong to the world of phenomena.

The Critique of Judgement, therefore, in spite of the new vistas it opens and the number of suggestions it offers, limits the horizon just where it was limited before. The final result is the primacy of ethical thought and moral action; ethical phenomenalism proves permanently victorious. It is not the organism but the ‘moral will’ and ‘moral freedom’ which must be regarded as the absolute purpose.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Kant tries to solve the scandal of philosophy in his third *Critique*. He attempts to abridge morality to understanding by the way of aesthetic judgement. Kant's philosophy in his first two *Critiques* remains formal, and therefore does not realize its objected civil tasks that concentrate on society. Now criticism reaches its missing execution¹⁴⁴ in the realm of aesthetics.

Kant's aesthetics has its revolutionary aspects as well as regressive ones. The cultivation of citizens, the search for a common aesthetic judgement, a state of disinterestedness in which the subject can attain his own aesthetic judgement comprise the revolutionary aspects. As to the regressions of Kant's aesthetics, we can observe enforcement of a certain human nature, disregard towards the difference of the 'other', and moments which finally lead to the emergence of protofascist systems of thoughts.

In my opinion the most revolutionary notion of Kant's aesthetic philosophy is the sublime. The sublime helps us find the mythos of our life and in the end creates our aesthetic judgement. Here is the rub and consummation of life. Feeling of the sublime

demands from us an intersubjective medium to transform pain (mathematical feeling) into happiness (dynamic feeling). Dynamical sublime is what renders imagination spontaneous in its unification of understanding and reason. Dynamical sublime takes us to the limits of our life. The beautiful is the main element that drives our preference to a common soul. Thus, everyone competes for the understanding of the rules of the sublime¹⁴⁵ in which all of us can come together without any suspicion. This atmosphere supplies a logical self-certainty of the civic in a society.

In 1981 Alasdair MacIntyre complains in his book *After Virtue* that “we have - very largely, if not entirely - lost our comprehension, both theoretical and practical of morality.”¹⁴⁶ MacIntyre has repeatedly criticized the “persistently unhistorical treatment of moral philosophy by contemporary philosophers in both the writing about and the teaching of the subject.”¹⁴⁷ Kant tries to retrieve comprehension of the lost bridge between theoretical and practical philosophy by the idea of the sublime.

The idea of the sublime, as explained above, is directly related to the idea of common sense. It is precisely through common sense that the aesthetic judgement can be intersubjective as well as subjective. According to Kant, common sense makes it possible to represent the subjective necessity of the judgement of taste as objective (C. J. Prg. 22, 76) in the sense of claiming universal assent. More importantly, Kant goes on to

¹⁴⁴ “Our age is, in especial degree, the age of criticism, and to criticism everything must submit. Religion through its sanctity, and law-giving through its majesty, may seek to exempt themselves from it.” C. P. R., p. 9.

¹⁴⁵ “There has never been a more sublime utterance, or a thought than the inscription upon the Temple of Isis (Mother Nature): ‘I am all that is, and that was, and that shall be, and no mortal hath raised the veil from before my face’”, C. J., p. 179.

¹⁴⁶ MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, p. 10.

make the broader claim that common sense is a presupposition of communicability of knowledge. He asserts that "common sense is assumed...as the necessary condition of the universal communicability of our knowledge, which is presupposed in every logic and in every principle of knowledge that is not sceptical" (C. J. Prg. 21, 76)

For Gadamer, Kant's theory of common sense represents an unfortunate dissipation of the humanist common sense tradition.¹⁴⁸ This tradition, going back to Cicero, Vico, and Shaftesbury, regards common sense as a mode of knowledge rooted in the moral and civic community. It is this sense of tradition as a mode of knowing which Gadamer reappropriates as the framework of his philosophical hermeneutics. In his view, Kant's common sense is an aesthetic, noncognitive alternative to traditional common sense which led nineteenth century hermeneutics into a subjective deadlock.

To a great degree, the collapse of moral consensus that MacIntyre describes can be seen as an extension of the mechanic conception of nature and the society of modern intellectual climate that has prevailed in Europe in modern ages. Principally opposed to systems of thought that rely on generalizing conceptual categories, homogeneity, and self contained hierarchical structures for their coherence, the most influential thinkers of this period have stressed, on the contrary, radical plurality, discontinuity, and decentralization in their critiques of Western traditions of modern thought.

Without the aesthetic salvation the category of a unified, integral self that could serve as the seat of moral knowledge and action had already begun to lose its credibility

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 11.

¹⁴⁸ Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, pp. 19-30.

in the wake of Freud's discovery of 'an unconscious realm of desires' and derives beyond our rational control. Richard Rorty remarked on the 'disintegration of a common moral context'.

Unity in one's life is the object again. 'More powerful and persuasive soul' is needed than ever before. This is because still there is no free, pure, autonomous reason. When reason is mentioned we understand it as a framework of our life or as an agent of predetermined duty. However, Kant's aesthetics says the opposite. By the notion of 'reflection' we can create a realm in which we can feel ourselves free. Foucault made use of Kant's idea of 'reflective distance'.

To reach this point of equanimity of interest we should keep our desire (*Willkür*) on the level of reflection. To show this what we need is to show not only the beautiful but also the ugly, the heteronomy in our interests. Now the stress is being made on desire. Rorty wrote affirmatively that he wanted "to focus on the way in which Freud, by helping us see ourselves as centerless, as random assemblages of contingent and idiosyncratic needs rather than as more or less adequate exemplifications of 'a common human essence', opened up new possibilities for the aesthetic life."¹⁴⁹ He is raising the voice of personal aesthetic judgement rather than the common human nature. For in Rorty's opinion, Freud has "helped us think of moral reflection and sophistication as a matter of 'self-creation' rather than self - knowledge."¹⁵⁰ By having liberated us from

¹⁴⁹ Rorty, "Freud and Moral Reflection" in *Pragmatism's Freud: The Moral Disposition of Psychoanalysis*, p. 12.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p.12.

the tyranny of conscious rationality, Freud has enabled us to perceive our unconscious energies as the raw material for the creation, potentially, of 'living works of art'.

Foucault, who himself played a major role in dismantling traditional moral frameworks by announcing the death of the autonomous, sovereign subject, expressed sentiments very similar to those of Rorty. He says that one of the ancient Greeks' main concern was "to constitute a kind of ethics which was an 'aesthetics of existence' ... I wonder if our problem nowadays is not, in a way, similar to this one, since most of us no longer believe that ethics is founded in religion, nor do we want a legal system to intervene in our moral, personal, private life." After again asserting his view that "Greek ethics is centered on a problem of personal choice, of aesthetics of existence", Foucault then made explicit what Rorty had only intimated. "What strikes me," Foucault told, "is the fact that in our society, art has become something which is related only to objects and not to individuals, or to life...But could not everyone's life become a work of art? Why should the lamp or the house be an art object, but not our life?"¹⁵¹ The rubble left behind by the annihilation of the old, self-sufficient subject, therefore, became for Foucault a quarry for the artful construction of a new, postmodern identity. Like Rorty, he thus thought that an ethics for our time could be established by applying aesthetic measures to the very fabric of our lives.

¹⁵¹ Foucault, "On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress," in *The Foucault Reader*, pp. 343 and 348-50

It would not be difficult to cite other contemporary thinkers. Among them there Ludwig Wittgenstein, who believes that “ethics and aesthetics are one”¹⁵² This is not a new understanding, for the view that considers God to be the ultimate artist of this world (*Demiurges*) has already emerged in Ancient Greece. This ultimate artist helps Kant solve the problem he created. How can subjective existence be lived without being an egoist or without needing analogy to an outside and unknown being ?

Ever since the romantics insisted on the absolute autonomy of art and above all attempted to disengage art from any moralistic or even vaguely didactic intentions, we have tended to see aesthetics and ethics as opposing rather than as complementary. But the history of the idea that ethics and aesthetics can be intelligibly conceived as being ‘one’ is absolutely crucial to understanding why, in our own days it has regained a respectable following and is being advanced by prominent and equally respected thinkers - and why, if it is carefully considered in its own terms, the idea must fail to offer what it promises. This is because the Good produces no action, or feeling but beautiful produces to be one with the thing. That is why some species are saved and others left by themselves.

Several thinkers therefore attempted to identify some purely internal or subjective measures for regulating behavior that would afford the greatest possible personal freedom while at the same time preventing actions that would impinge on the freedom or well being of others. Like the proposals advanced today by Rorty, Foucault,

¹⁵² Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, p. 146-147 proposition 6.421.

and others, aesthetic theories to offer the best means of fulfilling the contradictory requirements also provide a lost bridge between theoretical and practical philosophy.

By widening the field of aesthetics to embrace not only the beauties of nature but such phenomena as human conduct Kant opened up a new age for philosophy. Beside this revolutionary side Kant's aesthetic philosophy has a certain number of regressions.

Although Kant is certain for the salvation of man's freedom through his conventional aesthetic judgment, he forces reason's ideas upon the taste of men. Thus he returns to 'intellectual intuition' which he declared as a jugglery of philosophers in *The Critique of Pure Reason*. Neither divine intellect nor human intellect makes Kant's philosophy objective. On the contrary it remains subjective and personal. Because Kant's subject is constituted through its own synthesising activities. This is a fundamental mistake. Kantian model is individualistic because the unity of things embraced in experience is reducible to the manifold of intuitions. Contrary to Kant's idea the world possesses a unity that is free from any synthesis on the part of any individual Kantian subject.

Kant's ideas become more dangerous than his previous thoughts. Because now he does not only limit reason but also history, society and humanity. Culture is revelation of nature and not a social historical production. It is anthropologically buried in human nature and essential for the revelation of human nature.

Goldmann suggests that in the critical philosophy of Kant totality may be gained only in semblance (*Schein*). Kant is against mimesis since he wants to eliminate duality

of phenomenon noumenon dichotomy in his aesthetic judgement. Thus, genius can be followed as a semblance. The “tragedy of Kant in *The Critique of Judgment* is where man obtains totality only in subjective appearances and not in concrete or authentic reality”.¹⁵³ In later times Kant’s theory of genius leads to the idea of a supreme nation and a high culture. The natural duty of the aesthetic education, as Kant prescribed, of the lower social classes by higher classes, can lead a state to fascism. This is because in fascism the political conflict of classes is displaced into an aesthetic harmony of discrete individuals with no consciousness of social relations beyond their participation in the spectacular work of art.

By the notion of the ‘other’ Levinas tries to destroy Kant’s asocial and transcendent subject. In Kant’s philosophy a certain, universal anthropologic structure is forced upon the subject. Thus, in Kantian ethics the difference of the other is not protected. With the new notion of ethics Levinas, on the other hand, attempts to retrieve the freedom that the ‘other’ has been deprived of.

...Critique does not reduce the other to the same as does ontology, but calls into question the exercise of the same. A calling into question of the same – which cannot occur within the egoist spontaneity of the same – is brought about by the other. We name this calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the other ethics. The strongness of the other, his irreducibility to the I, to my thoughts and my possessions, is precisely accomplished as a calling into question of my spontaneity, as ethics¹⁵⁴

In his work named *Ethics and Infinity*, Levinas produces the notion of ‘face’ against idle contemplation of Kant’s subject. As to Levinas the ‘other’ does not remain disinterested

¹⁵³ Goldmann, *Immanuel Kant*, p. 52

¹⁵⁴ Levinas., *Totality and Infinity*, p.43.

before the world. Indeed, the face does not simply remain there contemplating. It responds.

Kantian conception of the subject inheres in itself seeds of the fascistic structures. One aspect of this ideology is prefigured in the early problems of irrationality. This is the appeal to German Culture in the service of a German revolution. For example, the dichotomic feature of Kant's aesthetics led Bauemler to the problem of irrationality. Bauemler suggests that the problem of 'irrationality' issues from the crises of subjectivity inaugurated by the reformation. Bauemler understood aesthetic as a response to the problem of irrationality, or the disturbance of the relation between concept and object, understood socially as that between general and particular. His argument that the renewed urgency of the problem of the relation between concept and object, general and particular, was due to a breakdown of religious authority; his search in German idealism for a new source of authority, and his desire for the reestablishment of authority on a national basis led Bauemler to fascism.¹⁵⁵

In Kant's aesthetics we select the company of aesthetes lost in idle contemplation (disinterestedness) of an art work. If a theory of aesthetics aims to reach freedom of society it must be the product of a community of people, scientists, scholars, artisans, citizens, going about their ordinary affairs – but with a different quality in their attitude both to the job in hand and to each other. Consequently, moral and cultural development is not a feature of a subject that is outside society and social relationships.

¹⁵⁵ Lukacs described Bauemler, as "Hitler's official philosophical ideologue," *The Destruction of Reason*, p. 339.

As a result Kant's Philosophy does not perform its promised tasks. 'Thing - in - itself' remains 'the plan of the world' that is the divine intellect. Thus, the phenomenon noumenon dichotomy appears again but now it is in the aesthetic conception of the world. There is a certain lack of social history in Kant's philosophy. This moment is what is sacrificed in the name of universality and of general validity of aesthetic and moral judgements. As we saw in *The Critique of Judgement* Kant's Philosophy of aesthetics remains anthropologic, religious and ends in morality. It has no power in its judgement for the persuasion of a certain society.

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